Cited by

Instead, “the real question at issue in a [disciplinary] proceeding is the public interest and an attorney’s right to continue to practice a profession imbued with public trust.” State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 909 (1981) (quotation omitted); see also Cotton, 587 N.W.2d at 699.

State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 909 (1981); Strength, Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings: Civil or Criminal in Nature?, 19 J. Legal Prof.

We have previously recognized several purposes served by prior Rule 37(17): (1) protection of the reputation of an attorney from meritless complaints; (2) protection of the anonymity of complainants; and (3) maintenance of the integrity of pending grievance committee investigations.

Attorney disciplinary proceedings are “not civil, or criminal or administrative in nature, but special in character, resulting from the inherent power of courts and to which not all of the ordinary procedural safeguards *269 apply.” State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 909, 437 A.2d 710, 714 (1981) (emphasis omitted), cert.

By removing from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, the public and those charged with the administration of justice are protected.” State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 909, 437 A.2d 710, 714 (1981) (citations omitted), cert.

“The test is not whether the information could be more comprehensive and certain,” but only whether the indictment meets the basic requirements of specificity and fair notice.

t is phrased in the conjunctive, a disjunctive instruction paralleling specific statutory language is adequate when the indictment has given the accused sufficient notice of the charges against him and the proof necessary for a conviction.” State v. Langdon, 121 N.H. 1065, 1070, 438 A.2d 299, 302 (1981) (citing State v. Bergeron, 115 N.H. 70, 73, 333 A.2d 721, 723-24 (1975) and State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 914, 437 A.2d 710, 718 (1981), cert.

As to the second question, assuming arguendo that it was properly preserved, the established rule is that “the privilege [against self-incrimination] applies not only to answers which would support a conviction, but also to those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute someone who claims the privilege.” State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 912, 437 A.2d 710, 716 (1981), cert.

State v. Shute, 122 N.H. at 504, 446 *589 A.2d at 1165; State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 914, 437 A.2d 710, 718 (1981), cert.

As of the date of the trial, the balance of $1,989.50 missing from the account had not been replaced.

The allegation that the defendant secreted certain property constituted an allegation of such an overt act and was sufficiently informative to allow the defendant to prepare for trial.

The supreme court is obligated to discipline a lawyer appropriately when the lawyer’s conduct seriously deviates from professional norms.

We agree that the information had to set forth the acts that constituted being an accomplice to receiving stolen property, and not merely the language of the accomplice statute.

Here, the indictment stated the necessary information, see State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 914, 437 A.2d 710, 718 (1981); State v. Taylor, 121 N.H. 489, 495, 431 A.2d 775, 778 (1981), and the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motions.

State v. Taylor, 121 N.H. 489, 495, 431 A.2d 775, 778 (1981); State v. Merski, 121 N.H. 901, 914, 437 A.2d 710, 718 (1981); State v. Greenwood, 113 N.H. 625, 626, 312 A.2d 695, 696 (1973).