Cited by

RSA 630:2, I; RSA 630:3, I; see also State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 70 (1982) (stating that “the State need not prove.

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 68-69 (1982) (amendment of indictment to change date of death of victim proper because amendment made prior to trial and defendant not prejudiced); Spade, 118 N.H. at 189-90 (amendment at trial *543 to time allegations in indictment proper where defendant could show no prejudice and trial court offered defendant one

Barton, 142 N.H. at 395, 702 A.2d at 339; cf. State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 69, 442 A.2d 578, 580-81 (1982) (indictment alleging that defendant “in concert with and-aided by” another acted “knowingly” suffi *585 ciently alleged accomplice or principal liability).

at 116, 276 A.2d at 478 (quotations omitted); see also State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 69, 442 A.2d 578, 581 (1982).

We have previously held that “in concert with” indictment language is sufficient to charge a defendant “as either a principal or accomplice.” State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 69, 442 A.2d 578, 581 (1982).

This language is sufficient to charge the defendant as both a principal and accomplice to second degree murder.

In State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 70, 442 A.2d 578, 581 (1982), we held that an indictment alleging death caused by a beating “with hands, feet and a bottle” was sufficient, and, more importantly, that a jury instruction permitting a finding of guilt without specificity as to which means was the cause of death was also sufficient.

State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 622, 495 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1985) (quoting State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982)).

at 901-19; see State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982) (decision to admit testimony within trial court’s discretion and jury can determine whether, and to what extent, to believe it).

According to the defendant, since the indictment, in using the phrase “in concert with,” charged him with accomplice liability, see, e.g., State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 69, 442 A.2d 578, 580-81 (1982), the jury would not have to find that he actually inflicted serious bodily injury in order to find him guilty of class A robbery.

Although a trial court may not summarily reject a criminal defendant’s claim of his right to cross-examine a witness who has correctly invoked the attorney-client privilege, it is up to a defendant who wishes to overcome an evidentiary privilege to show that the admission of privileged information is at least reasonably necessary to his defense.

The burden of an objecting party who wishes to keep such issues from the finder of fact is, however, especially heavy, for questions of credibility and reliability fall within the jury’s classic province, see, e.g., State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982).

“The admissibility of evidence is generally within the discretion of the trial court,” State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982), and we will uphold its rulings “unless there is a clear abuse of discretion,” Peters v. McNally, 123 N.H. 438, 440, 462 A.2d 119, 121 (1983) (citations omitted).

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 422 A.2d 578, 582 (1982); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 412 A.2d 1009 (1982); Smith, supra at 437, 503 A.2d at 776 (the weight given to testimony at trial depends on the credibility of the witnesses as determined by the jury).

Lessard.” See State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 69, 442 A.2d 578, 580-81 (1982); RSA 626:8, 111(a) (one is guilty as an accomplice if “[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits another person in committing it, or aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it”).

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 68-69, 442 A.2d 578, 580 (1982) (no error in allowing State to amend date in indictments for murder and robbery, since an exact date is not an element of either offense).

The conversation was at most ambiguous in that it could or could not have referred to the case against the defendant, and the trial court was not presented with any “evidence that justice would not be done if the trial continued.” State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 74, 442 A.2d 578, 584 (1982).

Generally, decisions *622 to admit testimony are within the discretion of the trial court, and “the jury can determine whether to believe all, part or none of it.” State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982).

Rulings on the admission of evidence are generally within the discretion of the trial court and are not ordinarily disturbed upon appeal.

Generally, the admissibility of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion.

Whether evidence is admissible is usually within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its rulings absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 70, 442 A.2d 578, 581 (1982); State v. Inselburg, 114 N.H. 824, 827, 330 A.2d 457, 459 (1974).

ed to this court does not contain the plaintiff’s actual offer of the letter into evidence, an excerpted portion of the trial transcript indicates that the plaintiff did, in fact, attempt to introduce the letter into evidence, but that “[i]t was excluded after some colloquy in chambers.” We begin our analysis by noting that evidence is admissible if it may aid the jury in its search for the truth.

The record indicates that Mr. and Mrs. Doe executed releases so that Dr. Dixon would provide a confidential report to the division of welfare in connection with this case.

First, the admissibility of evidence is a question of law for the trial judge, rather than a question of fact for the jury.

A trial judge has broad discretion to admit evidence.

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1980).

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982); State v. Dupuy, 118 N.H. 848, 853, 395 A.2d 851, 854 (1978).

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 70, 442 A.2d 578, 581 (1982); State v. Taylor, 121 N.H. 489, 495, 431 A.2d 775, 778 (1981).

The fact that the defendant’s evidence of good character was irrelevant to the offenses charged is immaterial to the trial judge’s decision, within his discretion, to admit the State’s evidence.

State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 606-07, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1980); see also State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 74, 442 A.2d 578, 583-84 (1982).

The fact that the master believed the repairman’s testimony rather than the defendant’s is not reversible error.

State v. Staples, 121 N.H. 959, 962, 437 A.2d 266, 267 (1981); State v. Welch, 120 N.H. 687, 688, 421 A.2d 142, 142-43 (1980); State v. Scarlett, 118 N.H. 904, 906, 907, 395 A.2d 1244, 1246, 1247 (1978); see also State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 72, 442 A.2d 578, 583 (1982).

The defendant argues that the physician-patient privilege should cover his admissions in the ambulance to the EMT’s. The statute, however, by its terms, applies only to physicians and surgeons and those working under their supervision.