Cited by

Milford Props., Inc., 120 N.H. at 582-83 (where there was no evidence that the town used an equalization ratio of 72% in the tax year at issue, it was incumbent upon the taxpayer “to establish the actual ratio of the assessed value to fair market value of other properties in the town for that year”); Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 33 (1982) (if a municipality does not stipulate to the validity of the DRA ratio “or otherwise indicate its acceptance of the accuracy by actual use,” the ta

at 15-16); see also Appeal of City of Nashua, 138 N.H. 261, 266 (1994) (“Our constitution mandates that all taxpayers in a town be assessed at the same proportion of fair market value.” (quotation and brackets omitted) (emphasis added)); Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32 (1982) (“It is well settled that the test in an abatement case is whether the taxpayer is paying more than his proportional share of taxes.” (emphasis added)).

(quotation and brackets omitted) (emphasis added)); Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32, 440 A.2d 451 (1982) ("It is well settled that the test in an abatement case is whether the taxpayer is paying more than his proportional share of taxes."

Appeal of City of Nashua, 138 N.H. 15 261, 266 (1994) (“Our constitution mandates that all taxpayers in a town be assessed at the same proportion of fair market value.” (quotation and brackets omitted) (emphasis added)); Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32 (1982) (“It is well settled that the test in an abatement case is whether the taxpayer is paying more than his proportional share of taxes.” (emphasis added)).

“It is well settled that the test in an abatement case is whether the taxpayer is paying more than his [or her] proportional share of taxes.” Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32, 440 A.2d 451, 453 (1982).

Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32, 440 A.2d 451, 453 (1982).

“It is well settled that the test in an abatement case is whether the taxpayer is paying more than his [or her] proportional share of taxes.” Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32, 440 A.2d 451, 453 (1982); see Milford Props., Inc. v. Town of Milford, 119 N.H. 165, 167, 400 A.2d 41, 42 (1979).

(A case like this is thus distinguishable from one in which the board does find disproportionality, which presupposes findings of specific value, see Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 440 A.2d 451 (1982), and from one in which the taxing authority concedes that the assessment is wrong, so that the board must make some finding about specific value.

Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32-33, 440 A.2d 451, 453-54 (1982) (citations omitted).

RSA 75:1 (Supp. 1983); Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32-33, 440 A.2d 451, 453-54 (1982).

Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32, 440 A.2d 451, 453 (1982); Sisters of Mercy v. Hooksett, 93 N.H. 301, 311, 42 A.2d 222, 229 (1945).

.” Bedford Development Co. v. Town of Bedford, 122 N.H. 187, 188, 442 A.2d 590, 591 (1982) (quoting Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 32, 440 A.2d 451, 453 (1981)).

recommendation, entered a decree in the plaintiff’s favor, abating its taxes, because the taxpayer had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that its taxes were disproportionately higher than those of other property owners within the taxing district.

The disproportion proved need not be disproportion with respect to similarly used property, but rather only with respect to ‘other property in general.’ ” Stevens v. City of Lebanon, 122 N.H. 29, 440 A.2d 451 (1982) (citations omitted).