Cited by

5 [¶14] “The fundamental requisite of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 758 (1980).

.”), overruled by Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753 (1980).

See, e.g., Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759-60 (1980) (remand appropriate when board refused to make findings but could have); Trustees of Lexington Realty Trust v. Concord, 115 N.H. 131, 134 (1975) (lack of findings in tax abatement case required remand when facts may or may not have supported the outcome).

“The fundamental requisite of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 758 (1980).

“The fundamental requisite of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980).

Appeal of City of Nashua, 138 N.H. 261, 265, 638 A.2d 779, 781 (1994); Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 607 (1980); RSA 541-A:20.

describing the parties’ opposing views, without making specific factual findings in support of its own conclusions, see Appeal of Loudon Road Realty Trust, 128 N.H. at 626, 517 A.2d at 845, it fails to meet its statutory obligation to make “a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting [its] findings,” RSA541-A:20 (Supp. 1993); see also Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 607 (1980), and its order *264 will therefore be vacated and remanded for

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980).

Assoc., Inc., 122 N.H. 484, 486, 446 A.2d 462, 463 (1982) (quoting Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 758, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980)).

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 758, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980) (due process protection requires hearing at a “meaningful” time).

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 758, 423 A.2d 603, 605-06 (1980).

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756-57, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980) (Eldridge test appropriate for State due process analysis).

est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if *149 any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. at 285, 513 A.2d at 338 -39 (citing Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 757, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980)).

Thus, the opinion below does not meet the requirement to make “specific, although not excessively detailed, basic findings in support of [its] ultimate conclusions,” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 607 (1980), an obligation now imposed by statute.

Second, it must be determined whether the procedures afford the appropriate procedural safeguards.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 505-06, 494 A.2d 270, 272 (1985); Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980).

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980).

“Otherwise, there is no means by which a reviewing court can determine whether the board complied with the statute and considered each of the enumerated factors, or whether the evidence sustains the board’s ultimate determination.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980).

15 and 12; see Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980); Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980); see also U.S. CONST, amend.

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980).

Second, it must be determined whether the procedures afford the appropriate procedural safeguards.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980) (citations omitted).

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 607 (1980).

In construing the extent of the right to counsel granted by RSA 135-B:5, we will accordingly apply the due process test set out in Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 423 A.2d 603 (1980), keeping in mind that “[t]he loss of liberty and stigmatization present in the involuntary commitment setting are fully comparable to the deprivations attending a criminal conviction.” Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 932-33, 380 A.2d 673, 676 (1977).

“The fundamental requisite of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 758, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980).

generally Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 423 A.2d 603 (1980).

Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d at 1057; Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d at 699-700; see Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 758, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980); V.S.H.

The right to be heard is grounded in the need for confrontation when adjudicative rights [or facts] are in dispute.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 758, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980) (citations omitted).

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 607 (1980); Appeal of Nationwide Ins.

Although administrative agencies conducting hearings must honor requests for specific findings of fact and rulings of law submitted by the parties, see Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 606-07 (1980), such agencies need not make specific findings in the absence of requests.

“It is not this court’s function to comb lengthy and detailed administrative records in search of evidence which would support an administrative finding.” Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 607 (1980).

Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 759, 423 A.2d 603, 606 (1980); Hanrahan v. City of Portsmouth, 119 N.H. 944, 947-48, 409 A.2d 1336, 1338-39 (1979).