Cited by

Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 602 (explaining that construing a statute to render some provisions superfluous is inconsistent with legislative intent).

v. N.H. Wetlands Council, 150 N.H. 1, 5 (2003) (observing that the term “including” in a statute “indicates that the factors listed are not exhaustive”); cf. Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 602 (1980) (“Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.”).

Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 602 (1980) (construing a statute to render some provisions superfluous is inconsistent with legislative intent).

Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 602, 420 A.2d 301 (1980) (construing a statute to render some provisions superfluous is inconsistent with legislative intent).

Silva v. Bolsch, 120 N.H. 600, 602 (1980) (construing a statute to render some provisions superfluous “would not be consistent with legislative intent”).

“In any statutory interpretation case, this court’s task is to determine legislative intent.” Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601 (1980).

Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.

As the determination of whether the commission has standing to appeal a ZBA decision is a matter of statutory interpretation, we turn first to the language in the statute itself.

In any statutory interpretation case, we determine the legislature’s intent by turning first to the language in the statute itself.

We construe each statute as a whole, Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 228, 589 A.2d 1016, 1018 (1991), and if the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent, Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

When we interpret statutes, our task is to determine legislative intent, beginning with the language of the statute itself.

If the language is plain and unambiguous, “we need not look beyond the statute for further indications of legislative intent.” Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

A workable grievance procedure must include a mechanism for resolution of disputes.” In interpreting a statute, we will “ascribe!'] to statutory words and phrases their usual and common meaning, unless the statute itself suggests otherwise.” Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 301-02 (1980); Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 930, 380 A.2d 673, 674 (1977).

The statute’s language is plain and unambiguous and, as such, “we need not look beyond the statute for further indications of legislative intent.” Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

Therefore, we do not view Fling v. Goodall as controlling our decision on the issue now before us. The legislature expressly limited the power of distraint to “goods and chattels.” Therefore, we will not interpret RSA 80:8 to include property that falls outside that exclusive itemization.

As the HFT notes, “the question of mootness is one of convenience and discretion and is not subject to hard- and-fast rules.” Williams v. City of Dover, 130 N.H. 527, 529, 543 A.2d 919, 921 (1988) (citing Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 301 (1980)).

“This court ascribes to statutory words and phrases their usual and common meaning, unless the statute itself *646 suggests otherwise.” Id.

Where language in the statute is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute for further indications of legislative intent.

However, as we have stated before, the question of mootness is one of convenience and discretion and is not subject to hard-and-fast rules.

When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, ‘we need not look beyond the statute itself for further indications of legislative intent.’ Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).” *327 The defendant argues that RSA 259:60 excludes an OHRV from the definition of a motor vehicle because it begins with the clause “[e]xcept where otherwise specified in this title.” He asserts that since an OHRV is defined separately in RSA 259:69, it cannot be a motor vehicle.

State v. Peabody, 121 N.H. 1075, 1077, 438 A.2d 305, 307 (1981); Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

RSA 21:2; Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 420 A.2d 301 (1980); see also King v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 302, 490 A.2d 796 (1985) (court ascribes plain and ordinary meaning to words of statute); In re Richard M., 127 N.H. 12, 497 A.2d 1200 (1985).

v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 165, 169, 470 A.2d 866, 869 (1983) (quoting Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980)).

The most pertinent portion of the law for purposes of this case, i.e., the term “service organization,” was not defined by the legislature anywhere in the statute, and DES argues that it applied to the term its “usual and common meaning” (quoting from the statutory construction language of Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980)).

Where possible, a statute should be construed to be consistent with its plain meaning.

“This rule is particularly forceful when the command is addressed to a public official.” Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 602, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, “we need not look beyond the statute itself for further indications of legislative intent.” Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

“This court ascribes to statutory words and phrases their usual and common meaning, unless the statute itself suggests otherwise.” Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980); see RSA 21:2.

The question of mootness is one of convenience and discretion and is not subject to hard-and-fast rules.

mandatory, or, if not wholly mandatory, what provisions are discretionary?” In determining legislative intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute itself.

Where the language of a statute is plain, we will give the words their usual and customary meaning.

On September 10, 1980, this court held that he had been removed illegally.

Town of Nottingham v. Harvey, 120 N.H. 889, 895-96, 424 A.2d 1125, 1129 (1980); Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980).

Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980); Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

In any statutory interpretation case, we first look at the language of the statute itself to determine legislative intent, and “[w]hen that language is plain and unambiguous,” we need not look beyond the statute for further indications of legislative intent.

Silva *896 v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980); North Hampton &c. Ass’n v. Commission, 94 N.H. 156, 159, 48 A.2d 472, 474-75 (1946).

We have no reason to suppose that the legislature intended that the word “privilege,” as used in RSA 635:1, should bear other than its common-law meaning.