Cited by

Citing State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 298 (1999), the defendant argues that if a declarant contends that he does not recall the relevant events, a defendant is prevented from having all proofs favorable to his defense produced and from being fully heard in his defense.

ermitted on cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court, and the broad discretion of the trial court to fix the limits of cross-examination applies to attacks upon [a witness’s] credibility as well as other proper subjects of cross-examination, the trial court may not completely deny a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness on a proper matter of inquiry.” State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866-67 (1981) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Graf, 143 N.

State v. Etienne, 146 N.H. 115, 118 (2001); State v. Allison, 134 N.H. 550, 557-58 (1991); State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 867 (1981).

Though fundamental, a defendant’s right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is not unfettered.

“Cross-examination is necessary to ensure that the defendant ‘shall have the right to produce all proofs that may be favorable to himself; to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and be fully heard in his defense....’” State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866 (1981) (quoting N.H. CONST, pt.

The defendant relies on State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 435 A.2d 1122 (1981), to argue that the defendant can offer evidence of his general character and that he is not limited by Rule 404(a)(1).

State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866, 435 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981); cf. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.

As cross-examination is the principal means by which a defendant can test a witness’s credibility, see Chaisson, 123 N.H. at 31, 458 A.2d at 103, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in criminal cases is “fundamental.” State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866, 435 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981).

Petition of Betty Sprague, 132 N.H. at 259-60, 564 A.2d at 835 (arbitrary time limit imposed on cross-examination deemed prejudicial); State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 867, 435 *432 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981) (prejudicial error when court completely denied defendant the right to cross-examine witness on a proper matter of inquiry concerning credibility).

Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, we will briefly address the validity of the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine Peach on an issue relating to bias, as this issue is certain to arise in a new trial.

Although we discuss and rely upon the dispositive issue of whether a variance was required to construct the addition according to the original plans, which included the overhanging balconies, we nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, also discuss the outcome we would reach if the substitute plans were properly before us. See State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 867, 435 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981).

The defendant relies on State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 435 A.2d 1122 (1981) to support his argument that denial of the right to cross-examine an adverse witness regarding matters that are important to the outcome of the trial was an abuse of discretion.

I, art. 15; see State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866, 435 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981).

The defendant argues that State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 435 A.2d 1122 (1981) requires a different result.

State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 435 A.2d 1122 (1981) (jury instruction); State v. Kelly, 113 N.H. 222, 306 A.2d 58 (1973) (comment by counsel).

This discretion applies to the admission of testimony regarding a witness’s credibility.

V; State v. Kelly, 113 N.H. 222, 223, 306 A.2d 58, 59 (1973); cf. State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 868-70, 435 A.2d 1122, 1125-26 (1981).

Such an inference may be drawn only when the witness is not “equally available (or unavailable) to both sides.” State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 869, 435 A.2d 1122, 1126 (1981).

Relying on State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 869, 435 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1981), the defendants also claim that the trial court improperly refused to give a requested instruction to the jury concerning its consideration of evidence of the defendants’ good character.

State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866, 435 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981); Kennedy v. Ricker, 119 N.H. 827, 832, 409 A.2d 778, 781 (1979).

State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866-67, 435 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981); State v. Mann, 112 N.H. 412, 414-15, 297 A.2d 664, 666 (1972).

The problem with this collateral attack by the defendant on his conviction is that he “opened the door” to the State’s line of testimony by seeking to present evidence of his good character.

Whether to allow cross-examination is generally within the discretion of the trial judge, but cross-examination cannot be denied if the inquiry is proper.