Cited by

State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 10-11 (1981) (upholding trial court’s determination that victim’s statement constituted an excited utterance even though it was made ten minutes after the startling event and was made in response to his father’s question).

For hearsay to be admitted as an excited utterance, “it must appear to the satisfaction of the presiding justice that the utterance was a spontaneous verbal reaction to some startling or shocking event, made at a time when the speaker was still in a state of nervous excitement produced by that event and before he had time to contrive or misrepresent.” State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 11 (1981) (quotations omitted).

at 331 (quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 12 (1981) (distinguishing juvenile delinquency proceedings from civil commitment).

For hearsay to be admitted as an excited utterance, “it must appear to the satisfaction of the presiding justice that the utterance was a spontaneous verbal reaction to some startling or shocking event, made at a time when the speaker was still in a state of nervous excitement produced by that event and before he had time to contrive or misrepresent.” State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 11, 425 A.2d 255, 257 (1981) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 307, 374 A.2d 427, 429 (1977

State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 12, 425 A.2d 255, 258 (1981) (holding an involuntary commitment proceeding to be a civil proceeding even though it utilized the standard of proof required in criminal trials).

135-0:36 (Supp. 1988) requires that a petition for involuntary commitment “be accompanied by a certificate of a physician who has examined the person sought to be committed within five days of the filing of the petition, stating that, based upon his examination, he believes the person sought to be committed is in such a medical condition as to be dangerous to himself or others.” State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 9-10, 425 A.2d 255, 256 (1986).

State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 12, 425 A.2d 255, 258 (1981) (commitment proceeding is civil, not criminal).

Town of Weare v. Paquette, 121 N.H. 653, 659, 434 A.2d 591, 596 (1981) (citing State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 11, 425 A.2d 255, 257 (1981)).

Town of Weare v. Paquette, 121 N.H. 653, 659, 434 A.2d 591, 596 (1981); State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 11, 425 A.2d 255, 257 (1981).

State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 10, 425 A.2d 255, 257 (1981) (psychiatric examination, as the basis for a physician’s certificate recommending civil commitment, that lasted only a few minutes was sufficient under RSA chapter 135-B).

Although we do not have a transcript of the bench conference before us, it appears from oral argument that the trial court concluded that the statements were hearsay but admitted them under the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule.

State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 12, 425 A.2d 255, 258 (1981); In re Field, 120 N.H. 206, 210-11, 412 A.2d 1032, 1034-35 (1980).

Last year, we considered the standard of proof applicable to involuntary civil commitment proceedings and again reaffirmed our support for the reasonable doubt standard.

Whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as a part of the res gestae is within the discretion of the trial court, and the mere fact that the statement is made in response to a question asked some time after the incident does not make the statement inadmissible as a matter of law.

*659 Whether testimony is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule is for the trial court to determine, State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 11, 425 A.2d 255, 257 (1981), and we will not disturb such a determination unless we find it to be clearly erroneous.

The petitioner may, if the circumstances warrant, file a new petition under RSA ch. 464-A (Supp. 1979) because guardianship proceedings are civil in nature, Hook v. Simes, 98 N.H. 280, 282, 98 A.2d 165, 167 (1953), and the rule against double jeopardy, therefore, does not apply to them.