Cited by

permitted to compare authenticated handwriting specimens against questioned documents.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 617 (1983).

Additionally, we have repeatedly “held that technical violations of RSA chapter 595-A do not require suppression of the items seized.” State v. Brown, 125 N.H. 346, 351 (1984); see State v. Huffman, 154 N.H. 678, 682 (2007); State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 606 (1983); State v. Gilson, 116 N.H. 230, 234 (1976); Saide, 114 N.H. at 737-38.

State v. Settle, 132 N.H. 626, 632 (1990) (“In an indictment for perjury, the making of the assertion under oath concerning a particular material fact is the gravamen of the crime.”); State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 589 (1983) (noting that perjury indictments quoted the defendant’s allegedly false statements).

State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 714-15 (2003); see also State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 591 (1983) (interpreting State and Federal Constitutions as guaranteeing a jury determination on all factual elements of the crime charged).

“[T]he purpose of the oath is to ensure that the affiant consciously recognizes his legal obligation to tell the truth.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 605, 467 A.2d 202, 224 (1983).

We will not reverse a jury verdict if the disputed charge “fully communicates the relevant applicable law and standards to be followed by the jury.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 613, 467 A.2d 202, 230 (1983).

“[T]he weight and credence to be given to the evidence at trial is the very essence of a jury’s function.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983).

The testimony of the former office manager, which the jury could reasonably accept in its entirety, see State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983), excludes any rational conclusion that the defendant assaulted her on another date between January and June 1991.

The resolution of doubtful or marginal cases with respect to the existence of probable cause will be “largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 604, 467 A.2d 202, 223 (1983).

The jury is free to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.

The trial court that issued the order is in the best position to determine whether its order has been violated.

As long as the trial court adequately instructs the jury on the applicable law, the court is under no obligation to include the specific language requested by a party.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 591, 467 A.2d 202, 215 (1983).

Finally, it was up to the jury to determine the weight and credence to be given Bailey’s testimony.

State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978); see State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983) (jury not bound by evidence, but can accept or reject evidence in whole or in part).

390, 422, 435 A.2d 747, 763 (1981); cf. State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 612, 467 A.2d 202, 229 (1983) (trial judge has broad discretion to determine scope of cross-examination).

103(b); State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 595, 467 A.2d 202, 217-18 (1983), and we therefore reach the merits of the defendant’s claim.

Immediately following the Gates decision, this court in State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 467 A.2d 202 (1983) cited Gates as well as Mandravelis in holding that “[h]earsay may establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if, given the totality of the circumstances, including the informant’s veracity and reliability and the basis of his information, there is a fair probability that the ev

.” and that “[rjeviewing courts should not invalidate a warrant by interpreting the evidence submitted in a hypertechnical sense.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 604, 467 A.2d 202, 223 (1983).

*586 “[W]e have noted many times that ‘[t]he test [for the sufficiency of an indictment] is not whether the information could be more comprehensive and certain, but only whether the indictment meets the basic requirements of specificity and fair notice.’” State v. Day, 129 N.H. 378, 380, 529 A.2d 887, 888 (1987) (quoting State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 589, 467 A.2d 202, 213 (1983) (citations omitted)).

It must state the elements of the offense with enough specificity to permit the defendant to prepare for trial and to protect him, whether acquitted or convicted, from later being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.’” State v. Day, 129 N.H. 378, 380, 529 A.2d 887, 888 (1987) (quoting State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 588, 467 A.2d 202, 213 (1983) (citations omitted)).

After all, “[t]he essence of a jury’s function is to determine the weight and credence to be given the evidence at trial.” State v. Meany, 129 N.H. 448, 451, 529 A.2d 384, 386 (1987); State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983).

Nevertheless, at common law, trial judges had broad discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination, State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 612, 467 A.2d 202, 229 (1983), and they continue to have broad discretion in this area under the New Hampshire Rules of Evidence.

State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983); see also State v. Chapin, 128 N.H. 355, 357, 513 A.2d 358, 359 (1986).

It must state the elements of the offense with enough specificity to permit the defendant to prepare for trial and to protect him, whether acquitted or convicted, from later being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 588, 467 A.2d 202, 213 (1983) (citations omitted).

State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 604, 467 A.2d 202, 223 (1983).” State v. Jaroma, 128 N.H. 423, 428, 514 A.2d 1274, 1277 (1986).

State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 613, 467 A.2d 202, 230 (1983) (soundness of instructions should be assessed in context of entire charge).

The propriety of the jury instruction at issue must be determined not by looking at the single instruction in isolation, but by considering the instructions in their entirety.

The weight to be given to any and all evidence “is the very essence of a jury’s function.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983).

In addition, another basic principle to which we adhere is the preference which we accord warrants, see Marcotte, supra at 248, 459 A.2d at 280, and the deference which we afford magistrates, especially-in close cases.

State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 611, 467 A.2d 202, 228 (1983); see also N.H. R. Ev.

It is the jury’s function to hear the testimony, observe the witnesses, and judge their credibility; it is not bound by the evidence and may accept or reject the evidence in whole or in part.

The trial court has no obligation to employ specific language requested by a party so long as the court otherwise adequately states the law.

A trial judge has broad discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination, and we will not reverse the court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion.

“The jury observes the witnesses, hears their testimony, and judges their credibility; it is not bound by the evidence and may accept or reject the evidence in whole or in part.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983) (citations omitted).

The prosecutor is granted great latitude in closing argument, both to summarize and discuss the evidence presented to the jury and to urge the jury to draw inferences of guilt from the evidence.

perjury may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 591, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983) (citations omitted).

Second, the court is not obligated to give the particular language of any requested instruction, so long as the court otherwise instructs the jurors accurately.

State v. Colby, 116 N.H. 790, 795, 368 A.2d 587, 591 (1976); State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 615, 467 A.2d 202, 231 (1983); State v. Fennelly, 123 N.H. 378, 390, 461 A.2d 1090, 1097 (1983).

will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.’” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 603, 467 A.2d 202, 223 (1983) (quoting State v. Doe, 115 N.H. 682, 685, 371 A.2d 167, 169 (1975)).

Reviewing courts should pay great deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause and should not invalidate a warrant by interpreting the evidence submitted in a hyper-technical sense.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 604, 467 A.2d 202, 223 (1983) (citations omitted).

State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 611, 467 A.2d 202, 228 (1983) (evidence relevant as “general background information”).

Although counsel is afforded wide latitude during closing argument, it is well settled that counsel may not argue facts that have not been introduced into evidence.

in the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 589, 467 A.2d 202, 213-14 (1983) (citations omitted).

“[T]he trial judge has broad discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination and, absent abuse, we will not overrule him.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 612, 467 A.2d 202, 229 (1983).

State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 606, 467 A.2d 202, 225 (1983); State v. Saide, 114 N.H. 735, 737-38, 329 A.2d 148, 149 (1974).

We conclude that the information in this case meets these requirements of specificity and fair notice.

We require'issues to be raised at the earliest possible time, because trial forums should have a full opportunity to come to sound conclusions arid'to ctrrrect errors in the first instance.

While we recognize that a magistrate’s determination of probable cause is entitled to deference by a reviewing court (see State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 604, 467 A.2d 202, 223 (1983)), we cannot emphasize too strongly that this determination by the magistrate must be made independently, based on the information presented to him.