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“The constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses is fundamental and of such importance that the State’s interest in protecting a certain class of witnesses must fall before the right of the accused to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself.” State v. Warren, 177 N.H. 196, 203 (2025),; see State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58 (1981).

The constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses is fundamental and of such importance that the State’s interest in protecting a certain class of witnesses must fall before the right of the accused to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself.

In order to determine the admissibility of such evidence, the trial court held a Howard hearing.

Certainly, the doctrine dispels the “old concept of equating a woman’s promiscuity with lack of credibility.” State v. Howard, *297 121 N.H. 53, 60 (1981).

I suggest, however, that Spaulding and its predecessor, State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58-59 (1981), limit the application of the rape shield law in certain cases and provide the bridge between Opinion of the Justices, 140 N.H. at 26-27, and the case at hand.

The trial court conducted a Howard hearing, after which it ruled that the defendant would be permitted to elicit testimony from the victim that she had discovered sexually explicit videos in her father’s home, but would not be allowed to cross-examine her regarding *206 the content of those videos or her exposure to any sexual paraphernalia.

The purpose behind this law is to spare the victim from unnecessary embarrassment, prejudice and harassment.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, citing New Hampshire Rules of Evidence 403, 412 and 608, and “the rules that require certain timeliness for filing Howard motions.” See State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53 (1981).

Prior to trial, he filed a motion in limine or, in the alternative, for a Howard hearing, see State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53 (1981), requesting, among other things, permission to introduce evidence of “prior false allegations by this alleged victim wherein she accused a male schoolmate at the Hilltop [S]chool in Somersworth of sexual assault.” On March 16, 1998, the court conducted a hearing on the motion, and defense counsel made the follo

denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980); cf. State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 60, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (1981) (rejecting “the old concept of equating a woman’s promiscuity with lack of credibility”).

He contends that the Superior Court (Groff, J.) erred: (1) in refusing his requests to admit evidence of prior sexual activity of the victim and for a hearing pursuant to State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981); (2) in ruling that the defendant had not met his burden under State v. Gagne, 136 N.H. 101, 612 A.2d 899 (1992), to trigger in camera review of the victim’s post-assault counseling records; and (3) by admitting into evidence a portion of a letter that did not meet the threshold

ernmental acts that would violate strong public policy of this State or leave its courts unable to render complete justice”); cf. Opinion of the Justices (Certain Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases), 140 N.H. 22, 26-27, 662 A.2d 294, 296-97 (1995) (declining to opine on constitutionality of evidence rule under doctrine of separation of powers where question not raised in request); State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58-59, 426 A.2d 457, 460-61 (1981) (statute construed in such a way as to not violate co

The government also has an interest in sparing victims of sexual assault from the additional trauma of repeated questioning.

Nonetheless, due process and the right of confrontation require the admission of such evidence when its “probative value in the context of that particular case outweighs its prejudicial effect on the prosecutrix.” State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 59, 426 A.2d 457, 461 (1981); see Dean, 129 N.H. at 748, 533 A.2d at 336.

We have recognized that the rape shield statute, RSA 632-A:6, represents an acknowledgment of the rights of personal privacy of alleged victims of sexual assault, see State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 59, 426 A.2d 457, 461 (1981), noting that “the old concept of equating a woman’s promiscuity with lack of credibility is seriously outdated and is no longer, if it ever truly was, deserving of respect by the courts.” Id.

State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 62, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (1981) (admission of evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual conduct should be limited to the extent possible without unduly infringing upon the defendant’s constitutional rights).

RSA 632-A:6 provides, in part, that “[p]rior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the [defendant] shall not be admitted into evidence in any prosecution under this chapter.” In State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981), “this court held that the requirement of due process and the right of confrontation limit the application of the rape shield law when evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity with people other than the defendant has a ‘probative va

New Hampshire’s rape shield law, RSA 632-A:6 (1986) (amended 1992), prohibits the admission of evidence regarding a victim’s prior consensual sexual activity with persons other than the defendant in a prosecution under RSA chapter 632-A, except when a defendant’s right to due process so requires.

This court has recognized the necessity of protecting the victim of a rape “from being subjected to unnecessary embarrassment, prejudice and courtroom procedures that only serve to exacerbate the trauma of the rape itself.” State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981) (affirming constitutionality of rape shield statute).

The defendant then filed a pretrial motion, with a memorandum in support thereof, requesting a hearing pursuant to State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58-59, 426 A.2d 457, 460-61 (1981) (defendant in rape prosecution must be given opportunity, upon motion, to demonstrate that due process requires admission of evidence regarding victim’s prior sexual activity).

The right of confrontation is ancient, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800-02 (1988), and fundamental in a criminal trial, State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58, 426 A.2d 457, 460 (1981).

Prior to trial, the defendant moved for a hearing with regard to the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the victim’s prior “sexual experiences” in accordance with State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981).

The defendant’s final argument is that trial counsel should have requested a Howard hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence of the prior sexual activity of the victims.

persons other than the Defendant.” See State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58-59, 426 A.2d 457, 460-61 (1981).

See, e.g., State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 59, 426 A.2d 457, 461 (1981); Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum.

Citing our decision in State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981), the defendant sought to examine the victim concerning her memory of the statement on the ground that the inquiry would highlight her allegedly inconsistent statements.

The judge thereby alluded to State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58-59, 426 A.2d 457, *351 460-61 (1981), in which this court held that the requirement of due process and the right of confrontation limit the application of the rape shield law when evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity with people other than the defendant has a “probative value in the context of [a] parti

In these combined appeals, we do not reach the issues raised by the denials of post-trial relief, because we reverse the conviction for failure to afford the defendant the hearing to which he was entitled under State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981).

If the earlier incident was consensual in fact but not in law, the applicability of the shield law has never been directly decided.

In trials for sexual assault, see RSA chapter 682-A (Supp. 1988), the rape shield statute, RSA 682-A:6 (Supp. 1983), “protects] the victims of rape from being subjected to unnecessary embarassment, prejudice and courtroom procedure that only serve to exacerbate the trauma itself.” State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981).

This court must construe statutes so as “to avoid conflict with constitutional rights whenever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977); see State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981).

Its purpose was to protect the victim of a rape “from being subjected to unnecessary embarrassment, prejudice and courtroom procedures that only serve to exacerbate the trauma of the rape itself.” State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981); see State v. LaClair, 121 N.H. 743, 745, 433 A.2d 1326, 1328 (1981).

Approximately one month after the defendant filed his notice of appeal, we held in State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 60-61, 426 A.2d *503 457, 462 (1981), that evidence of a prosecutrix’ prior sexual activity could be relevant and admissible in certain limited circumstances.

The defendant claims that his cross-examination would have elicited evidence impeaching the prosecutrix’s credibility, and that our *40 holdings in State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 58, 426 A.2d 457, 460 (1981) and State v. LaClair, 121 N.H. 743, 745, 433 A.2d 1326, 1328 (1981) require such evidence to be admitted.

The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in criminal cases is fundamental.

In State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981), this court recently considered the constitutionality of the rape shield law.