Cited by
Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171.
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State v. Marchand
164 N.H. 26
N.H. 2012
This distinction is significant, for “the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime,” and “insanity and criminal intent are distinct aspects of a criminal trial between which the jury is capable of distinguishing.” State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 777 (1980) (quotation omitted).
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State v. Blomquist
891 A.2d 469
N.H. 2006
At a bifurcated trial, the issues of guilt and sanity would have been decided at separate proceedings.
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State v. Hall
808 A.2d 55
N.H. 2002
State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 777 (1980); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
- State v. Hennum 441 N.W.2d 793 Minn. 1989
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State v. Sundstrom
552 A.2d 81
N.H. 1988
We addressed this issue earlier in State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 776-77, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (1980), where we held that absent a manifest abuse of discretion, a criminal defendant has no right to present the last closing argument, even if he bears the burden of proof with respect to the defense of insanity.
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State v. Walters
519 A.2d 305
N.H. 1986
We are satisfied that the court considered all possible prejudice of the challenged evidence to the defendant in ruling specifically that its potential for prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value.
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State v. Place
513 A.2d 321
N.H. 1986
“It is well settled that the trial judge has wide discretion in the admission and exclusion of opinion evidence, and that we will uphold his ruling unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Peters v. McNally, 123 N.H. 438, 440, 462 A.2d 119, 121 (1983); see Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 522 (1982); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980).
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State v. Sands
467 A.2d 202
N.H. 1983
State v. Donovan, 123 N.H. 446, 447, 462 A.2d 125, 126 (1983); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980).
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State v. Donovan
462 A.2d 125
N.H. 1983
State v. Dustin, 122 N.H. 544, 547, 446 A.2d 1186, 1188 (1982); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980).
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State v. Fernald
462 A.2d 122
N.H. 1983
State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980); see State v. Barker, 117 N.H. 543, 546, 374 A.2d 1179, 1180 (1977).
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Peters v. McNally
462 A.2d 119
N.H. 1983
In determining the admissibility of opinion evidence, the trial judge must consider whether the testimony will assist the jury, and whether the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.
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State v. Dustin
446 A.2d 1186
N.H. 1982
In determining the admissibility of evidence which is relevant and otherwise unobjectionable, the trial court should balance the potential prejudice of the evidence against its probative value.
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State v. Thresher
442 A.2d 578
N.H. 1982
The admissibility of evidence is generally within the discretion of the trial court.