Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171.

13 citing documents.

  • State v. Marchand 164 N.H. 26 N.H. 2012
    This distinction is significant, for “the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime,” and “insanity and criminal intent are distinct aspects of a criminal trial between which the jury is capable of distinguishing.” State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 777 (1980) (quotation omitted).
  • State v. Blomquist 891 A.2d 469 N.H. 2006
    At a bifurcated trial, the issues of guilt and sanity would have been decided at separate proceedings.
  • State v. Hall 808 A.2d 55 N.H. 2002
    State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 777 (1980); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
  • State v. Hennum 441 N.W.2d 793 Minn. 1989
  • State v. Sundstrom 552 A.2d 81 N.H. 1988
    We addressed this issue earlier in State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 776-77, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (1980), where we held that absent a manifest abuse of discretion, a criminal defendant has no right to present the last closing argument, even if he bears the burden of proof with respect to the defense of insanity.
  • State v. Walters 519 A.2d 305 N.H. 1986
    We are satisfied that the court considered all possible prejudice of the challenged evidence to the defendant in ruling specifically that its potential for prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value.
  • State v. Place 513 A.2d 321 N.H. 1986
    “It is well settled that the trial judge has wide discretion in the admission and exclusion of opinion evidence, and that we will uphold his ruling unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Peters v. McNally, 123 N.H. 438, 440, 462 A.2d 119, 121 (1983); see Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300, 444 A.2d 519, 522 (1982); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980).
  • State v. Sands 467 A.2d 202 N.H. 1983
    State v. Donovan, 123 N.H. 446, 447, 462 A.2d 125, 126 (1983); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980).
  • State v. Donovan 462 A.2d 125 N.H. 1983
    State v. Dustin, 122 N.H. 544, 547, 446 A.2d 1186, 1188 (1982); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980).
  • State v. Fernald 462 A.2d 122 N.H. 1983
    State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980); see State v. Barker, 117 N.H. 543, 546, 374 A.2d 1179, 1180 (1977).
  • Peters v. McNally 462 A.2d 119 N.H. 1983
    In determining the admissibility of opinion evidence, the trial judge must consider whether the testimony will assist the jury, and whether the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.
  • State v. Dustin 446 A.2d 1186 N.H. 1982
    In determining the admissibility of evidence which is relevant and otherwise unobjectionable, the trial court should balance the potential prejudice of the evidence against its probative value.
  • State v. Thresher 442 A.2d 578 N.H. 1982
    The admissibility of evidence is generally within the discretion of the trial court.