Cited by

Contrary to the defendants’ assertion that they are being punished for their lawyer’s conduct, the law is clear that “‘action taken in the conduct and disposition of civil litigation by an attorney within the scope of his [or her] authority is binding on [the] client.’” Bock (Lundstrom) v. Lundstrom, 133 N.H. 161, 163-64, 573 A.2d 882, 884 (1990) (quoting Manchester Housing Auth.

As a matter of longstanding law in New Hampshire, “action taken in the conduct and disposition of civil litigation by an at *164 torney within the scope of his authority is binding on his client.” Manchester Housing Auth.

We have long held that “action taken in the conduct and disposition of civil litigation by an attorney within the scope of his authority is binding on the client.” Manchester Housing Auth.

denied, Coleman Oil Co., Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 411 U.S. 967 (1973); McIsaac v. McMurray, 77 N.H. 467, 471, 93 A. 115, 118 (1915), and although we have acknowledged an attorney’s authority to make binding settlements for his or her clients, Manchester Housing Authority v. Zyla, 118 N.H. 268, 269, 385 A.2d 225, 226-27 (1978); Eida v. Stoddard, 111 N.H. 123, 125, 276 A.2d 12, 13 (1971); cf. Ducey v. Corey, 116 N.H. 163, 164, 355 A.2d 426, 426 (1976), we hold, on the facts before us, that

Manchester Housing Authority v. Zyla, 118 N.H. 268, 268-69, 385 A.2d 225, 226-27 (1978).

The defendant cites State v. Perron, 118 N.H. 245, 385 A.2d 225 (1978) in support of her claim that the probative value of the gun and bullet was far outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

In finding that the defendant was liable, the district court applied Manchester Housing Authority v. Zyla, 118 N.H. 268, 385 A.2d 225 (1978), which holds that in the absence of evidence that an attorney acted beyond the scope of his authority, the attorney’s settlement agreement binds the client.

v. Zyla, 118 N.H. 268, 269, 385 A.2d 225, 226 (1978); see also Bower v. Davis & Symonds Lumber Co., 119 N.H. 605, 608, 406 A.2d 119, 121-22 (1979).

Marchand v. Company, 95 N.H. 422, 424-25, 65 A.2d 468, 470 (1949); cf. State v. Perron, 118 N.H. 245, 246, 385 A.2d 225, 225 (1978).

v. Zyla, 118 N.H. 268, 269, 385 A.2d 225, 226-27 (1978) (quoting Beliveau v. Amoskeag Co., 68 N.H. 225, 226, 40 A. 734, 734 (1894)).

find, in its sound exercise of discretion, that the probative value of the [testimony] outweighed the possible prejudice.” State v. Perron, 118 N.H. 245, 246, 385 A.2d 225, 225 (1978).

Manchester Housing Authority v. Zyla, 118 N.H. 268, 385 A.2d 225 (1978) (action within scope of lawyer’s authority during civil litigation binding on client).

cy was the “property of another” as defined in RSA ch. 634, the arson statute, or a finding that the alleged fire was “of an incendiary origin.” Motions for a directed verdict of acquittal and dismissal of an indictment may be granted only when the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom construed most favorably to the State would not permit a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Conklin, 115 N.H. 331, 338, 341 A.2d 770, 776 (1975); see State v. Perron, 118 N.H. 245, 385 A.2d 225 (1978) (memorandum).