Cited by

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72 (1980).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72 (1980).

In Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980), we explained that an argument in favor of that rule of construction "is that, since the object of the contract is to provide protection for the insured, the construction that best achieves this purpose should be adopted."

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770-71, 423 A.2d 980 (1980); see also Colony Ins.

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770-71 (1980); see also Colony Ins.

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 768 (1980).

“When policy language is ambiguous, the language subject to different interpretations is construed in favor of the insured, and the insured’s reasonable expectations of coverage are considered.” Titan Holdings Syndicate v. City of Keene, N.H., 898 F.2d 265, 270 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770-72 (1980).

however, the petitioner argues that Commerce must “drop down” to provide primary coverage because primary coverage under the Foremost policy is neither “available” nor “collectible.” To the petitioner, the words “available” and “collectible” are ambiguous and, therefore, because we must interpret them strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured, see Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771 (1980), they mean “actually available” and “actually collectible.” See Benzer v. I

The rationale for our firmly-established rule is equally as strong in such a situation as in any other: the insurer controls the language of the policy and the insurance contract aims “to provide protection for the insured.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771 (1980) (adopting the majority rule of construction because “[t]his rule reflects the fundamental principle of contract law that doubtful language is to be construed most strongly against the party who used it in drafting t

Co., 140 N.H. 15, 20 (1995); Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771 (1980).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770 (1980); cf. Transcontinental Ins.

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771 (1980).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

“In construing insurance policy language which purports to limit liability or prevent stacking, we employ a strict construction standard which requires that ambiguities in insurance policies be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Wilkinson, 132 N.H. at 443, 569 A.2d at 751; see Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770-72, 423 A.2d 980, 984-85 (1980).

“In general, the rules governing the construction and interpretation of written contracts apply with equal force to insurance policies.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

“In general, the rules governing the construction and interpretation of written contracts apply with equal force to insurance policies.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

“The insurance company remains free to limit its liability through ‘clear and unambiguous policy language.’ Given the strict standard for interpreting insurance contracts established by Trombly [v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980)], the policy language must be so clear as to create no ambiguity which might affect the insured’s reasonable expectations.” Cacavas v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 128 N.H. 204, 208, 512 A.2d 423, 425 (1986).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

If the policy’s terms are clear and unambiguous, the language “must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning.” Trombley v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980) (quotation omitted).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

Smith, 130 N.H. at 123-24, 536 A.2d at 167-68; Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

Any determination of intent is generally made by this court.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980) (citations omitted).

McCarty relies on our holding in Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980), for the assertion that both policies must be construed against the insurer as a matter *318 of law where there is ambiguity, which “include[s] all terms about the meaning or application of which reasonable disagreement between the contracting parties is possible.” Smith v. Liberty Mut.

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

Co. v. Desfosses, 130 N.H. 260, 263, 536 A.2d 205, 207 (1987) (quoting Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980)).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 984-85 (1980); Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 118 N.H. 744, 747, 394 A.2d 839, 841 (1978).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 769, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980); Cacaras v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 128 N.H. at 207, 512 A.2d at 425.

Since a policy is to be read as a whole, see Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 768-69, 423 A.2d 980, 983 (1980), and since there is no indication that “damages” might have a different meaning under Coverage J, it follows that the company’s contractual obligation is limited by the amount necessary to compensate the insured for the uninsured motorist’s infliction of bodily injury, to the exclusi

ambiguous language is con *75 strued against the insurer.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

Co. v. Desfosses, 130 N.H. 260, 263, 536 A.2d 205, 207 (1987); Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 984-85 (1980).

Furthermore, the law of this State provides that an ambiguous policy provision must “be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980); see also Desfosses, supra at 263, 536 A.2d at 208; Haley v. Allstate Ins.

Town of Epping supra; Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

policy is of less concern than the public policy reasons for permitting stacking.” The defendant concedes that the standard for interpreting insurance policy language is that governed by Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980), followed in Cacaras, 128 N.H. at 207, 512 A.2d at 425, which requires that an ambiguous policy be construed in favor of the insured; however, MPL argues that the exclusionary language in Gelinas’ uninsured motorist policy is clear

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980).

Accordingly, under Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 984-85 (1980), the term “owner” should be construed in favor of the insured to include one who lawfully possesses the vehicle with the consent of the title owner, as Nadine did.

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 433 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

The standard we have applied since those decisions is that “an ambiguous insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980); see also Smith v. Liberty Mut.

Following the rule of Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980), that an ambiguity in an insurance policy is to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer, we held in Young that use of the term “executive officer” extended coverage to a plant *120 manager with responsibilities and powers virtually identical to those of Smith as manager of La

The court then strictly construed the ambiguity against its drafter, citing Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 984-85 (1980).

In addition, “an ambiguous insurance policy will be construed in favor of the *338 insured and against the insurer.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

They reason that the ambiguity must be resolved against State Farm under the rule in Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Hampshire-Vermont, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980).

In Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980), we stated that the standard for interpreting insurance contracts relied on “the assumption that the reasonable insured both reads the policy and comes to some understanding of its terms.

The city submits that it is entitled to prevail under the rule in Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New *809 Hampshire-Vermont, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980), that coverage ambiguities will be resolved against the insurer and in favor of the insured.

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).

Because we must consider the policy as a whole, however, see Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 768, 423 A.2d 980, 983 (1980), we consider the effect of the subsequent sentence in the policy upon our analysis.

at 883-84, 424 A.2d at 206-07; see Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 772, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980).