Cited by

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 796 (1980) (noting that a few weeks would not be long enough to establish a “psychological family”), overruled on other grounds by In re Craig T., 147 N.H. 739 (2002); In the Matter of R.A., 153 N.H. at 111 (Nadeau and Galway, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating concern that prohibiting custod

“Generally, courts interpret words and phrases that are defined in the common law according to their common-law meanings, unless defined by the statute in which they appear.” In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 794 (1980) (emphasis added), cert.

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798 (1980) (recognizing that DCYF must “work with the natural parents to enable them to provide a family for their own children” (quotation omitted)), cert.

In In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 793 (1980), cert.

The common law defines a person in loco parentis as “one who intentionally accepts the rights and duties of natural parenthood with respect to a child not his own.” In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 795 (1980), cert.

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798-99 (1980), cert.

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798 (1980), overruled on other grounds by In re Craig T., 147 N.H. at 744-45.

State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 719 (1978); see also In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798 (1980).

Although keeping William in a stable environment is certainly consistent with his best interests, see In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 797, 424 A.2d 178, 181 (1980), cert.

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 794-95, 424 A.2d 178, 180 (1980), cert.

“[W]hile parental improvement is a factor to consider, the real test is whether there is a reasonable possibility of reuniting parent and child within a reasonable period of time.” In re J.J., 458 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Vt. 1983); see also In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798, 424 A.2d 178, 182 (1980), cert.

denied, 452 U.S. 964 (1981), and In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 424 A.2d 178 (1980) (“flicker of interest” is not sufficient to bar a finding of abandonment) in contending that her contact with her child was not so minimal as to justify a finding of abandonment.

In re Diana P. required that courts consider the realities of DCYS’s limited resources when determining whether a parent was given every opportunity to correct the situation that created the need to terminate the parent’s rights.

In New Hampshire, the rights of parents over the family are considered “natural, essential and inherent rights within the meaning of the New Hampshire Constitution, part I, article 2.” In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798, 424 A.2d 178, 182 (1980), cert.

when consistent with the intent of the chapter.” In attempting to divine that intent, he urges us to remember that the statute was enacted “to facilitate the adoption of children by removing ‘arbitrary and broad restrictions’ on who could adopt and to enable the courts to respond to the varied circumstances of individual cases.” In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 796, 424 A.2d 178, 181 (1980) (citing Bianco, Chamberlain and DeGrandpre, The New Hampshire Adoption Statute: An Overview, *764 18 N.H.B.J.

The existence of the parental relationship is a factual question.

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798, 424 A.2d 178, 182 (1980), cert.

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798, 424 A.2d 178, 182 (1980); In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 388-89, 402 A.2d 169, 174 (1979); State v. Robert H. _, supra at 716, 393 A.2d at 1389.