Cited by

substantial liberty interests”); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 268 (1980) (holding that the adjudicatory hearing time limits in juvenile delinquency and child-in-need-of-services proceedings were jurisdictional because the time limits amounted to codification of a juvenile’s “speedy trial” and due process rights).

Next, the court considered the purpose of the statute as stated in RSA 169-B:1 and our decision in In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 266-67 (1980), and ruled that the statute’s purpose supported the respondent’s interpretation that RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) requires a manifestation review in all circumstances.

RSA 606:10, II pertains to criminal proceedings, whereas juvenile proceedings are civil in nature and “separate from the trial of criminal cases.” RSA 169-B:16, I (2014); see In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 267 (1980) (noting that “[t]he purposes and procedures delineated in RSA ch. 169-B” reflect “the desire to divorce juvenile proceedings from the criminal process whenever possible”).

For example, in In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260 (1980), we observed that the mandatory time limits for holding adjudicatory hearings under RSA chapter 169-B (Supp. 1979) and RSA chapter 169-D (Supp. 1979) were “legislative pronouncement[s] of a child’s right to the expeditious resolution of his alleged delinquency or ‘need for services’ rooted in his right to due p

Thus, for instance, a petition for a guardianship, similar to a petition for juvenile delinquency or a criminal complaint, In re DeLucca, 121 N.H. 71, 72 (1981), must provide the ward with “adequate notice of the substance of the proceedings.” In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 262 (1980) (referring to a juvenile petition).

Fournier, 158 N.H. at 446-47, 452-53; see Ruel v. N.H. Real Estate Appraiser Bd., 163 N.H. 34, 42-43 (2011) (describing Fournier); see also In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 267-68 (1980) (holding that statutory time limits for adjudicatory hearings in juvenile delinquency and “children in need of services” proceedings implicate liberty interests and, thus, failure to comply with those limits required court to forfeit personal jurisdiction, unless waived by the juvenile).

It “guarantees children their constitutional rights, and encourages the use of rehabilitative and treatment resources whenever possible.” In re Kirsten P., 158 N.H. at 160 (quotation omitted); see also In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 266 (1980).

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 266 (1980) (finding that the mandatory time limits on juvenile adjudicatory hearings under RSA chapter 169-B and RSA chapter 169-D are a “legislative pronouncement of a child’s right to the expeditious resolution of his alleged delinquency or ‘need for services’ rooted in his right to due process”).

Although not controlling, it is significant as indicating that the legislature intended the statute to be mandatory.

“The prescription of mandatory time limits, however, also reflects the concurrent legislative concern for procedural due process.” In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 267 (1980).

We have stated that the definitions of “delinquent” and “child in need of services” do not overlap.

As we have previously noted, the mandatory time limit set forth in RSA 169-B:14 is analogous to an adult offender’s right to a speedy trial.

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 268 *606 (1980) (interpreting RSA 169-B:14, II (Supp. 1979) and RSA 169-D:13, II (Supp. 1979) as granting juveniles a statutory right to an adjudicatory hearing within the prescribed time limits unless the juvenile waives that right by causing a delay or requesting a continuance).

This is especially so where the purpose of the statute is to protect private rights.

found legislative intent to impose a jurisdictional limitation when mandating time limits for holding adjudicatory hearings,” In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 268 (1980), we have declined to infer “such intent when the mandate is imposed to further a remedial or dispositional objective.” Cavanaugh, 127 N.H. at 36.

The term “shall” is generally regarded as a command.

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264 (1980) (statute should not be interpreted to lead to an absurd, unjust, or illogical result).

Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that a “sales representative” should include corporations because it effectuates the overall purpose of the statute, and that to exclude corporations from the definition of “sales representatives” would lead to an absurd and illogical result.

The use of the word “shall” is generally regarded as a legislative command.

RSA chapter 169-B provides a comprehensive framework for the district court to “guarantee children their constitutional rights, and encourage the use of rehabilitative and treatment resources whenever possible.” In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 266, 414 A.2d 934, 937 (1980).

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1396 (unabridged ed. 1961) (defining “may”).

RSA 169-B-.14, II; RSA 169-B:24 (1994); see In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 268, 414 A.2d 934, 938 (1980).

In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 379, 469 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1983); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980).

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 268, 414 A.2d 934, 938 (1980); see In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377, 380-81, 469 A.2d 1351, 1353 (1983).

We cannot redraft a statute “to make it conform to an intention not fairly expressed” in its language.

In re Russell C, 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980) (statutory language not given its ordinary meaning where context of statute indicates different meaning).

Concord cites In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 414 A.2d 934 (1980), and quotes the synopsis of House Bill 894 (which amended the statute to require that uninsured motorist coverage be equal to the liability limits of the policy) to the effect that the purpose of the bill was “‘to increase the minimum limits of motor vehicle liability insurance for bodily injury

Counsel could have responded by seeking a continuance, if he needed one, to provide time for inquiry to the mental health agency and for consultation with a psychologist if one was available.

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 266, 414 A.2d 934, 937 (1980); see RSA 169-D:1, IV, V (Supp. 1983).

We have, of course, found legislative intent to impose just such a jurisdictional limitation when mandating time limits for holding adjudicatory hearings in delinquency or CHINS cases.

The plaintiff cites In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 414 A.2d 934 (1980) in support of his argument that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction once it had found no abuse.

The board’s determination that the term “hours” includes the subject of the number of hours to be worked was consistent with federal *795 cases, see Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and with the plain meaning of the language of the statute, see In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 414 A.2d 934 (1980).

To hold that Larry B.’s placement there was *380 proper would be to defeat both the specific intent of RSA 169-D:17, II (Supp. 1983) and one of the principal goals of the juvenile statutes: to create procedural safeguards sufficient to protect individual rights against the vicissitudes of unlimited discretion.

Town of Nottingham v. Harvey, 120 N.H 889, 895, 424 A.2d 1125, 1129 (1980); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980).

The use of the word “shall” is generally regarded as a command, Appeal of Concord Natural Gas Corp., 121 N.H. 685, 691, 433 A.2d 1291, 1295 (1981); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980), and the use of the negative as a prohibition.

These sections providing for de novo appeals were adopted in 1979 as part of the comprehensive reorganization of RSA chapter 169, the law dealing with abused, neglected and delinquent children, and children in need of services.

We conclude that the new language of RSA 169-B:19, 1(f) (Supp. 1981) is directory only, manifesting a legislative preference that, whenever possible, delinquent juveniles should not be mingled with CHINS, or with abused or neglected children.

New Hampshire-Vermont Health Service v. Commissioner of Insurance, 122 N.H. 268, 272, 444 A.2d 508, 510 (1982); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980); Blais v. Town of Goffstown, 119 N.H. 613, 616-17, 406 A.2d 295, 297-98 (1979).

The word “shall,” generally regarded as a command, Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. at 601-02, 420 A.2d at 302, indicates that a statute was intended to be mandatory.

The defendant first argues that his continued detention since his arrest has been illegal because the district and superior courts failed to comply with RSA 169-B:14 (Supp. 1979) and that, therefore, the rationale of In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 268, 414 A.2d 934, 938 (1980), requires those courts to forfeit jurisdiction.

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 262, 414 A.2d 934, 935 (1980); State v. Fields, 119 N.H. 249, 253, 400 A.2d 1175, 1177 (1979).

Silva *896 v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980); In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 264, 414 A.2d 934, 936 (1980); North Hampton &c. Ass’n v. Commission, 94 N.H. 156, 159, 48 A.2d 472, 474-75 (1946).

The word “shall” is generally regarded as a command.

This interlocutory transfer raises the question whether the statutory “speedy trial” sections of RSA 169-B (Supp. 1979), applicable to district courts, shall likewise apply in cases of de novo appeals by juveniles to superior court.

In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 414 A.2d 934 (1980); Arnold v. City of Manchester, 119 N.H. 859, 409 A.2d 1322 (1979); Londonderry v. Faucher, 112 N.H. 454, 457, 299 A.2d 581, 583 (1972).