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Such evidence “consists of proof of facts or circumstances which give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the fact sought to be proved.” State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 16 (1980).

In doing so, however, we emphasize that “[t]he law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred.” State v. Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 16 (1980); see also 2 C. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 11:7, at 270 (7th ed. 1994) (“It is axiomatic that circumstantial evidence can suffice to sustain a verdict —”); United States v. Andrino, 501 F.2d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Circumstantial evidence is not less probative than

Consistent with the MPC, the State must prove that the defendant’s purpose was to hinder apprehension, prosecution or conviction.

to interfere with a public servant where their “purpose [in] *434 detaining Officer McKenzie’s vehicle was to preserve proof that a crime had been committed, not to prevent him from performing official duties.” With respect to intent, however, the statute requires only a conscious object to interfere with the public servant; the defendant’s underlying or ultimate motive for doing so is irrelevant.

Facts may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and “[t]he law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred.” State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 16, 413 A.2d 300, 302 (1980).

We have previously ruled that a fact may be proven by circumstantial evidence.

State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 16, 413 A.2d 300, 302 (1980); State v. Canney, 112 N.H. 301, 302, 294 A.2d 382, 383 (1972).

If there is any substance to the claim that the trial court’s ruling “chilled” the defendant’s desire to take the stand in his own defense, we point to State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 18-19, 413 A.2d 300, 303-04 (1980), as dispositive of the claim.

He cites as the sole authority for this argument the dissenting opinion in State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 20, 413 A.2d 300, 304 (1980).

In ruling upon the admissibility of the three prior convictions in question, the trial court relied in part upon this court’s holding in State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 532, 465 A.2d 1201 (1983), which in turn has its precedential base in the earlier holdings in State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 18-19, 413 A.2d 300, 303-04 (1980), and State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293-94, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).

State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 16-17, 413 A.2d 300, 302 (1980); cf. State v. Taylor, 118 N.H. 855, 857, 395 A.2d 505, 507 (1978) (flight from scene creates inference of guilt).

In State v. Wayne Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 18-19, 413 A.2d 300, 303-04 (1980), addressing a similar argument, we acknowledged that a defendant might elect not to testify if the trial court ruled that prior criminal convictions were admissible at trial.

In State v. Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 19, 413 A.2d 300, 303-04 (1980), we allowed evidence of the witness’ prior convictions to impeach his credibility even though the crimes did not involve dishonesty.

.” State v. Wills, 107 N.H. 107, 108-09, 218 A.2d 47, 48-49 (1966); see State v. Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 16, 413 A.2d 300, 302 (1980).

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support such a finding.

It is well established in this State that evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions may be admitted in the discretion of the trial court when the defendant has testified and the State seeks to impeach his credibility.