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On the other hand, Walter’s representation of the defendant gave rise to a countervailing duty — to zealously represent the defendant.

It is well settled that whether a prospective juror is free from prejudice is a determination to be made in the first instance by the trial court on voir dire.

It is well-settled that whether a prospective juror is free from prejudice is a determination to be made in the first instance by the trial court on voir dire, State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 102, cert.

“While interracial rape may be a classic catalyst of racial prejudice, the prejudice inheres in the identities of the parties and victims and not in the specific issues.” Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 103, 411 A.2d 1113, 1115-16, cert.

specifically directed to matters that conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him.” State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 103, 411 A.2d 1113, 1115-16 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, supra at 594), cert.

There is no need to consider the reliability issue unless the police procedures have been shown to be unnecessarily suggestive.

stice orders, which may include forfeiture and either sale or destruction as the public interest requires in the discretion of the court or justice, and in accordance with due process of law.” The standard of review of the trial court’s order issued pursuant to RSA 595-A:6 (Supp. 1981) is whether the court abused its discretion in denying Hebert’s motion for the return of the coins and silverware.

e.g., State v. Gonzales, 120 N.H. 805, 807-08, 423 A.2d 608, 610 (1980); State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 322, 449 A.2d 1288, 1290-91 (1980); State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 101-02, 411 A.2d 1113, 1114-15, cert.

It is well settled that whether or not a prospective juror is free from prejudice is a determination to be made in the first instance by the trial court on voir dire, State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 102, 411 A.2d 1113, 1116, cert.

The trial court reasonably concluded that the remaining jurors could render a fair verdict.

The extent of the voir dire examination is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial judge, State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 103, 411 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1980); State v. Dunbar, 117 N.H. 904, 905, 379 A.2d 831, 832 (1977); State v. Colby, 116 N.H. 790, 793, 368 A.2d 587, 590 (1976), and we find no abuse of that discretion in this case.

Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594, 597 (1976); State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 103, 411 A.2d 1113, 1115-16 (1980).

See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 120 N.H. 458, 461, 417 A.2d 8, 10 (1980); State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 104, 411 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1980).

On this appeal, the defendant claims that the procedures employed were unduly suggestive and that therefore the “totality of the circumstances” test, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972), should be applied, see State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 101-02, 411 A.2d 1113, 1114-15 (1980), and that the result would mandate a finding that the procedures resulted in an unreliable identification.

Martineau v. Perrin, 119 N.H. 529, 404 A.2d 1100 (1979); State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 411 A.2d 1113 (1980); State v. Carroll, 120 N.H. 458, 417 A.2d 8 (1980).

Accordingly, any complaints defendant might now have concerning the court’s jury charge are deemed waived.

RSA 500-A:22 (Supp. 1979); State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 411 A.2d 1113 (1980).

Evans v. United States, 397 F.2d at 678; Hood v. United States, 365 F.2d at 951; State v. Gullick, 120 N.H. 99, 411 A.2d 1113 (1980); Cotter v. Cotter, 119 N.H. 426, 402 A.2d 198 (1979); Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 118 N.H. 325, 386 A.2d 1261 (1978).

Even assuming that this array was unnecessarily suggestive, exclusion of the testimony in question is not required.