Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Hudson, 409 A.2d 1349.

23 citing documents.

  • In re G.W. N.H. 2023
    We have previously suggested, when addressing a prior version of RSA 135- C:45, I, with similar language, see RSA 135-B:37 (Supp. 1973) (repealed by Laws 1986, 212:4), that it is the judge, and not the psychiatrist, who determines whether the respondent has met the involuntary admission standard, see State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967 (1979) (stressing that “it is the judge who makes the decision and not the psychiatrist” and observing that the prior version of this statute “empower[ed] the cour
  • In Re Christopher K. 923 A.2d 187 N.H. 2007
    Regarding prior law, however, we noted in State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963 (1979), that the specific act requirement of RSA 135-B:28 (repealed 1986) “relates to the original commitment only.
  • State v. Fichera 903 A.2d 1030 N.H. 2006
    See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966 (1979); see also State v. Plante, 134 N.H. 456, 460-62 *593 (1991); State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 448-49 (1985); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152 (1980).
  • State v. Cotell 722 A.2d 507 N.H. 1998
    Lastly, the defendant contends that the court’s finding of a speedy trial violation provides an independent basis for dismissal of the indictments.
  • In re Fasi 567 A.2d 178 N.H. 1989
    Our cases emphasize, however, that the “condition of dangerousness is not a medical concept, but rather a legal one,” and that a court may “overrule the recommendation of a psychiatrist against involuntary commitment.” State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979).
  • In re Champagne 519 A.2d 310 N.H. 1986
    [and] may be based on a pattern of prior action and testimony relating to the question whether or not any cure for defendant’s condition has been effected.” State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351-52 (1979).
  • State v. Mercier 509 A.2d 1246 N.H. 1986
    Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 935, 380 A.2d 673, 678 (1977); see State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979).
  • State v. Robb 484 A.2d 1130 N.H. 1984
    Opinion of the Justices, 122 N.H. at 203-04, 442 A.2d at 596 (citing State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979)).
  • State v. Monahan 480 A.2d 863 N.H. 1984
    From October 1980 until May 1981, the record is barren of any facts which would support a diligent, good-faith effort by the State to bring the defendant to trial.
  • State v. Preston 467 A.2d 243 N.H. 1983
    These consequences give rise to the constitutional duty of the State to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring a defendant to trial, State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979), and the court-imposed duty of the State to bring an indictment within sixty days from the date of arrest.
  • State v. Paradis 455 A.2d 1070 N.H. 1983
    We need not dwell long on the meaning of the phrase “that it would be dangerous for him to go at large.” As we have said before, it is not necessary that the court find that the defendant will commit crimes if he is not confined.
  • Opinion of the Justices 442 A.2d 594 N.H. 1982
    The burden is satisfied if the court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is ‘a potentially serious likelihood’ that he will be a danger to himself or others.” State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979) (citations omitted).
  • Roy v. Perrin 441 A.2d 1151 N.H. 1982
    Pierre v. Vitek, 114 N.H. at 770, 330 A.2d at 119.
  • State v. Quinlan 440 A.2d 13 N.H. 1982
    State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979) (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969)).
  • In Re Vernon E. 435 A.2d 833 N.H. 1981
    Although dismissal of criminal charges may be the appropriate remedy in cases in which the defendant’s right to a speedy trial is violated, State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979), it is not necessarily the remedy in cases which involve a violation of a- defendant’s right not to be detained without due process.
  • State v. Perkins 435 A.2d 504 N.H. 1981
    In determining matters such as the defendant’s mental state, we have repeatedly stated “that it is the judge [or trier of fact] who makes the decision and not the psychiatrist.” State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979); see State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011-12 (1980).
  • Gowen v. Brothers 430 A.2d 159 N.H. 1981
    State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980); State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979).
  • State v. Hudson 425 A.2d 255 N.H. 1981
    The defendant has been before this court twice in the recent past, see State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979); Hudson v. Miller, 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612 (1979), and much of the factual background of this case is clearly set forth in those cases.
  • State v. Hastings 417 A.2d 7 N.H. 1980
    State v. Fraser, 120 N.H. 117, 411 A.2d 1125 (1980); State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979).
  • State v. Novosel 412 A.2d 739 N.H. 1980
    State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979); State v. Isaac, 119 N.H. 971, 409 A.2d 1354 (1979); Barker v. Wingo supra; State v. White supra; see State v. Fraser, 120 N.H. 117, 411 A.2d 1125 (1980).
  • State v. Rullo 412 A.2d 1009 N.H. 1980
    State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979); Moore v. Duckworth, 99 S. Ct. 3088 (1979).
  • State v. Fraser 411 A.2d 1125 N.H. 1980
    Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972); State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979).
  • State v. Isaac 409 A.2d 1354 N.H. 1979
    State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979); State v. Dufield supra; State v. Cole, 118 N.H. at 831, 395 A.2d at 190.