Cited by

See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966 (1979); see also State v. Plante, 134 N.H. 456, 460-62 *593 (1991); State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 448-49 (1985); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152 (1980).

Since the Helgemoe decision, and prior to 1987, defendants were only required to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 422 A.2d 578, 582 (1982); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 412 A.2d 1009 (1982); Smith, supra at 437, 503 A.2d at 776 (the weight given to testimony at trial depends on the credibility of the witnesses as determined by the jury).

Although the court was not bound in any event to accept Dr. Violette’s conclusions, see State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980), other testimony by the doctor seriously limited the force of his opinions.

State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 151, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980) (citations omitted).

In so arguing the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence or argue any inference not reasonably to be drawn.

Therefore, these pieces of evidence, viewed together, create the reasonable inference that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the collision.

Consequently, the testimony of Daniel Williams, a licensed psychologist, concerning the needs of the children was supportive of the State’s petition, but not conclusive on the issue of whether the “mental illness” of each parent required termination of their parental rights with respect to each child, which was ultimately a finding made by the master.

State v. Thresher, 122 N.H. 63, 71, 442 A.2d 578, 582 (1982); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1980).

State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1980); cf. Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 95, 441 A.2d 1151, 1155-56 (1982) (standard for assessing competency).

ed that the plaintiff “appreciated the grave nature of the charge against him and the severity of the consequences he faces upon his conviction and that he was able to assist his attorney in his defense and to comprehend the necessary elements of the crimes of first and second degree murder.” The court could have disbelieved any part of the testimony even if no evidence was introduced to rebut it.

*954 Gowen v. Brothers, 121 N.H. 377, 380, 430 A.2d 159, 160-61 (1981); State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980).

State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 125, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (1978).

In determining matters such as the defendant’s mental state, we have repeatedly stated “that it is the judge [or trier of fact] who makes the decision and not the psychiatrist.” State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979); see State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011-12 (1980).

State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980); State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 967, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979).

This court affirmed that conviction.

*909 A prosecutor can argue an inference in his closing argument if that inference “can be reasonably drawn from the evidence.” State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 153, 412 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1980).

With this in mind, we reiterate that the “apportionment of the burden of proof [under Novosel] violates no constitutional guarantee.” State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980), citing Patterson v. New York, 436 U.S. 197 (1977).

State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 412 A.2d 1009 (1980); State v. Wills, 107 N.H. 107, 218 A.2d 47 (1966).

Although it is true that the prosecutor may not introduce material facts not in evidence during his closing argument, State v. Gaiolas, 116 N.H. 216, 218, 356 A.2d 695, 696 (1976); see State v. Baron, 98 N.H. 298, 299, 99 A.2d 912, 913 (1953), he may argue facts that can reasonably be inferred from the evidence presented, State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 153, 412 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1980).

Cragin v. Woollett, 104 N.H. 202, 182 A.2d 457 (1962); see State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 412 A.2d 1009 (1980).