Cited by

7 See State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 532, 535 (1983); State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 283 (1980).

Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248 (2004), Bergmann, and State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278 (1980).

1995); cf. State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 285, 415 A.2d 320, 324 (1980) (decided under prior law) (expressing preference for defense counsel to challenge admissibility of impeachment evidence pretrial).

While his testimony corroborated the victim’s testimony, we do not exclude evidence on that basis alone.

“‘We cannot base a finding that the trial court abused its discretion upon mere speculation.’” State v. Bergmann, supra at 100, 599 A.2d at 504 (quoting State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 284, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980)).

“We cannot base a finding that the trial court abused its discretion upon mere speculation.” State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 284, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980).

The State relies upon the cases of State v. Scarlett, 121 N.H. 37, 41, 426 A.2d 25, 28 (1981); State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 281, 415 A.2d 320, 322 (1980); and State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 307, 386 A.2d 808, 815 (1978), in arguing that the trial court applied an erroneous standard for determining the admissibility of the testimony, requiring that Agent Deedrick must be able to identify a particular person as the source of the crime sce

Our review of whether the trial court committed error is limited by the record presented, and we will not base our findings upon mere speculation.

This contemporaneous objection rule applies in a proceeding upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Roy v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 88, 100, 441 A.2d 1151, 1159 (1982), and the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he objected in the appropriate forum, cf. State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 284, 415 A.2d 320, 323-24 (1980) (defendant bears burden of placing on the record indications that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior convictions).

State v. Hickey, supra at 59, 523 A.2d at 64; State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 283, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980).

State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 285, 415 A.2d 320, 324 (1980); Brown, supra at 115, 480 A.2d at 45.

We are mindful that the brief of defendant’s counsel also seeks to demonstrate that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was erroneous when judged under State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 415 A.2d 320 (1980), Super.

Although the determination of the admissibility of a prior conviction is within the sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 283, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980), the court must make careful use of that discretion.

The defendant bears the burden of developing a record from which an abuse of discretion may be predicated on appeal and of proving an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

In this context the likelihood of unfair prejudice from admitting the disputed evidence was slight, and the trial court abused no discretion in finding that the defendant had failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that the risk of such prejudice outweighed probative value.

The defendant has the burden of developing a record from which an abuse of discretion may be predicated on appeal.

Since the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude his prior convictions well in advance of trial in accordance with the procedure required by this court in State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 285, 415 A.2d 320, 324 (1980), the State’s non-compliance with Rule 68 is of no moment in the context of this case.

After a hearing on the record, see State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 285, 415 A.2d 320, 324 (1980), the court excluded a counseled 1977 conviction for attempted theft by unauthorized taking.

The defendant bears the burden of requesting a hearing on the record and developing a record from which an abuse of discretion may be predicated.

“The determination of remoteness is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 283, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980).

Our review of whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting or excluding certain evidence is limited to the record presented; such a determination cannot be made on mere speculation.

see State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 415 A.2d 320 (1980) (use of prior convictions for impeachment purpose).

at 535, 465 A.2d at 1202-03; State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 283, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980).

Here, the Trial Judge (Johnson, J.) held a hearing pursuant to our decision in State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 285-86, 415 A.2d 320, 324 (1980), and made rulings on the record regarding each of the defendant’s prior convictions.

State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 283, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980); State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 294-97, 235 A.2d 111, 115-16 (1967), cert.

We held, in that case, that a court must exercise discretion in deciding whether to permit a defendant to be cross-examined about prior criminal convictions.

The defendant was offered an opportunity for a hearing so that the alleged prejudicial effect of the conviction could be stated on the record but out of the jury’s presence.

State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 283, 415 A.2d 320, 323 (1980); State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 295, 297, 235 A.2d 111, 114-15, 116 (1967), cert.

His conviction was affirmed by this court on May 5, 1980.

The defendant next challenges the court’s refusal to rule in advance of trial that the State would not be permitted to cross-examine the defendant regarding his prior assault convictions in the event that he testifed in his own behalf.

In State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 285, 415 A.2d 320, 324 (1980), we stated that such pretrial procedures are “well suited to cases involving the use of prior convictions because of the prejudice inherent in them.” While our concern in Staples was the possible undue prejudice that might arise against the defendant, we are here more concerned with und

Indeed, it would be speculation to assume otherwise, and we will not base a finding of harmful error on speculation.

State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 281, 282, 415 A.2d 320, 322 (1980); Wrobleski v. Constellation Corp., 118 N.H. 532, 533, 388 A.2d 944, 945 (1978); Sylvain v. Estate of Sylvain, 117 N.H. 546, 548, 375 A.2d 598, 599 (1977).