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On occasion, our past decisions have articulated an equal protection test where the “first inquiry concerning equal protection is whether persons similarly situated are being treated differently under the statutory law.” Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29 (1980).

We follow our holding in Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29 (1980), that “persons whose land is about to be taken by the State are ‘similarly situated.’” We now turn to the second question in the equal protection analysis, which is “whether the classification created by the statute is justifiable.

See, e.g., Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 67, 489 A.2d 600, 602 (1985) (zoning ordinance violated equal protection rights guaranteed by Part I, Articles 1, 2, 10, 12, and 14); Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980) (statute violated equal protection rights guaranteed by Part I, Articles 1, 10, 12, and 14).

The city contends that Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 466 A.2d 923 (1983), and Gazzolla v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 411 A.2d 147 (1980), require a pre-taking public hearing to determine necessity, and V.S.H.

Equal protection *182 requires that those who are similarly situated be treated similarly.

.The first inquiry concerning equal protection, under both the State and Federal Constitutions, is “whether persons similarly situated are being treated differently under the statutory law.” State v. Callaghan, 125 N.H. 449, 451, 480 A.2d 209, 210 (1984) (quoting Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980)); see also Locke v. Ladd, 119 N.H. 136, 138, 399 A.2d 962, 963 (1979).

The plaintiff bases her claim of right to a pre-decision hearing on Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 466 A.2d 923 (1983) and Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 411 A.2d 147 (1980), each of which rested on an equal protection analysis that the plaintiff has failed to develop in this case.

The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.

They assert that equal pay for equal work is a precondition to the ownership, use and enjoyment of private property, which are fundamental rights, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 14, 466 A.2d 923, 927 (1983); Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151-52 (1980), so it cannot be said that equal pay for equal work is of any less stature.

“The first inquiry concerning equal protection is whether persons similarly situated are being treated differently under the statutory law.” State v. Callaghan, 125 N.H. 449, 451, 480 A.2d 209, 210 (1984) (quoting Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980)).

15 and 12; see Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980); Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980); see also U.S. CONST, amend.

The appellants respond by citing the rule that implied repeal of an earlier statute by later enactment is disfavored and may be found only where statutes are mutually irreconcilable.

Principles of equal protection are intended to ensure that persons similarly situated are similarly treated by government.

Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 30, 411 A.2d 147, 151-52 (1980) (quoting Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977)).

“The first inquiry concerning equal protection is whether persons similarly situated are being treated differently under the statutory law.” Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980).

That statute was enacted after our decision in Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 411 A.2d 147 (1980).

The defendant has failed to present convincing evidence that the changes in RSA 504:1 (Supp. 1979), see Laws 1975, 493:1, repealed the mandatory sentencing requirement of RSA 262-B:7 I. See Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 28, 411 A.2d 147, 150 (1980); Arnold v. City of Manchester, 119 N.H. 859, 863, 409 A.2d 1322, 1325 (1979).

This fundamental right is recognized in the same article which recognizes the right of “enjoying and defending life and liberty.” Id.