Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Olszak v. Peerless Insurance, 406 A.2d 711.

16 citing documents.

  • BALAMOTIS v. Hyland 992 A.2d 548 N.H. 2010
    In addition, “[t]he burden of proving estoppel is upon the party asserting it, and its existence is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Olszak v. Peerless Ins.
  • Appeal of Stanton 805 A.2d 419 N.H. 2002
    “The burden of proving estoppel is upon the party asserting it, and its existence is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Olszak v. Peerless Ins.
  • Byblos Corp. v. Salem Farm Realty Trust 692 A.2d 514 N.H. 1997
    Similarly, “[t]he burden of proving estoppel is upon the party asserting it, and its existence is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Olszak v. Peerless Ins.
  • Trefethen v. New Hampshire Insurance Group 645 A.2d 72 N.H. 1994
    Co., 119 N.H. 686, 690-91, 406 A.2d 711, 714-15 (1979) (agent’s knowledge of an insured’s needs and expectations are imputed to the insurance company so that it may be es-topped from denying coverage).
  • Hawthorne Trust v. Maine Savings Bank 618 A.2d 828 N.H. 1992
    “The burden of proving estoppel is upon the party asserting it, and its existence is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Olszak v. Peerless Ins.
  • Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont 608 A.2d 840 N.H. 1992
  • Goodwin Railroad v. State 517 A.2d 823 N.H. 1986
  • V & V Corp. v. American Policyholders' Insurance 500 A.2d 695 N.H. 1985
  • City of Concord v. Tompkins 471 A.2d 1152 N.H. 1984
    Co., 119 N.H. 686, 690, 406 A.2d 711, 714 (1979); Monadnock School District v. Fitzwilliam, 105 N.H. 487, 488-89, 491, 203 A.2d 46, 48, 49-50 (1964).
  • Town of Epping v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 444 A.2d 496 N.H. 1982
    Co., 121 N.H. 760, 762, 435 A.2d 507, 509 (1981); Olszak v. Peerless Ins.
  • Robbins Auto Parts, Inc. v. Granite State Insurance 435 A.2d 507 N.H. 1981
    Co., 119 N.H. 686, 691, 406 A.2d 711, 715 (1979); RSA 491:22(a) (Supp. 1979), and that any ambiguities in the language of the policy will be “construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).
  • Appeal of Cloutier Lumber Co. 431 A.2d 112 N.H. 1981
    Co., 119 N.H. 686, 690, 406 A.2d 711, 714 (1979); Town of Nottingham v. Lee Homes, Inc., 118 N.H. 438, 442, 388 A.2d 940, 942 (1978).
  • Continental Insurance v. Seppala & Aho Construction Co. 430 A.2d 157 N.H. 1981
    In the case before us the master found that, had the defendant’s officers read the policy, they “would have noted that the actual rate [would be] determined *377 at the close of the policy year and that the selling agent had no authority to determine rates.” Cf. Olszak v. Peerless Ins.
  • Karol v. New Hampshire Insurance 414 A.2d 939 N.H. 1980
    Co., 119 N.H. 686, 406 A.2d 711 (1979); Magulas v. Traveler’s Ins.
  • Lariviere v. New Hampshire Insurance Group 413 A.2d 309 N.H. 1980
    Co., 119 N.H. 686, 406 A.2d 711 (1979); Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
  • New Hampshire Insurance v. Schofield 406 A.2d 715 N.H. 1979
    an express exclusion, the question is “whether the ordinary layman in the position of the insured could reasonably be expected to understand that certain exclusions qualified the policy’s grants of coverage.” Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 118 N.H. 744, 745, 394 A.2d 839, 841 (1978); Brown v. City of Laconia, 118 N.H. 376, 386 A.2d 1276 (1978); see Olszak v. Peerless Insurance Co., 119 N.H. 686, 406 A.2d 711 (1979).