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The petitioners now appeal to this court, raising a number of issues that can generally be consolidated under the following overarching questions: (1) whether Iron Horse’s proposed project met the six criteria for a wetland CUP set forth in section 10.1017.50 of the Portsmouth Zoning Ordinance; and (2) whether Iron Horse’s permit requests were barred under the doctrine of Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980).

Collectively, the abutters claimed that the respondents 1 The ZBA determined that due to a change in the statute between applications, the respondents’ application was not barred pursuant to Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980), and neither party challenges this decision.

Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980); CBDA Dev., LLC v. Town of Thornton, 168 N.H. 715 (2016).

Although the board was required to provide the applicant with written reasons for its decision, see RSA 676:3, I, it was not, contrary to the petitioner’s argument, required “to articulate [a] rational explanation for reaching a different result in 2020.” We also reject the petitioner’s argument that the subsequent-application doctrine articulated in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980), applies here.

On appeal, the petitioners argue that the subcommittee’s decision was unreasonable, unlawful, and unjust for the following reasons: (1) the subcommittee was unlawfully constituted; (2) the denial of Antrim I barred Antrim Wind’s Antrim II application under the doctrine of res judicata as well as the subsequent application doctrine as set forth in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980) (hereafter, the Fisher doctrine); and (3) there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the subc

On appeal, the petitioners argue that the subcommittee's decision was unreasonable, unlawful, and unjust for the following reasons: (1) the subcommittee was unlawfully constituted; (2) the denial of Antrim I barred Antrim Wind's Antrim II application under the doctrine of res judicata as well as the subsequent application doctrine as set forth in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 412 A.2d 1024 (1980) (hereafter, the Fisher doctrine); and (3) there is insufficient evidence in the record to s

On appeal, Perreault argues that the trial court erred when it determined that: (1) our decision in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980), prevented him from relitigating the modification of the driveway; (2) collateral estoppel applied, preventing him from arguing the driveway could not be modified; and (3) the interpretation of the zoning ordinance regarding the width of the driveway by the subsequent administrative officer was lawful and reaso

Applying the subsequent application doctrine set forth in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980), the Board decided that it could not consider CBDA’s second application because it did not materially differ in nature and degree from CBDA’s initial application.

On June 25, 2012, the ZBA denied the request on the basis that Whitman had failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances since the ZBA’s October 16, 2008 decision, citing Fisher v. Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980).

Brandt contends that, under the standard set out in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 191 (1980), material changes in circumstances occurred during the fifteen years between the 1994 ruling and the 2009 application, including changes in the case law interpreting the criteria for granting a variance, the City’s zoning ordinance and policy documents, and the physical layout of the property.

erts that it submitted a plan that “clearly showed that the proposed building site was the lowest point on the property that would support both vehicular access and state septic.” Second, it argues that the ZBA could not legally accept and consider a new variance application because “[t]here has been no change of circumstances affecting the merits of the application.” See Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 190 (1980).

We have, however, applied a similar test for zoning board of adjustment review in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980), and its progeny.

Barrington further argues, however, that to the extent DES considered “MyKro Waters’ letters to be a resubmission of the already denied application, based on no change in events,” its approval of the application was contrary to Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980).

The ZBA held a hearing on the threshold issue of whether, under Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980), it should consider the merits of the application.

In upholding the ZBA’s decision that the plaintiffs 1998 application was not materially different in nature and degree from the 1995 variance application, the superior court relied upon our decision in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980).

The board initially denied the plaintiff’s application because the “request was similar to a previous application that [the plaintiff] presented to this Board on September 22,1992[,] which was denied.” This was a procedural denial pursuant to Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 191, 412 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1980), and did not reach the merits.

Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 412 A.2d 1024 (1980) (zoning board may not lawfully consider subsequent variance petition absent material change in circumstances or material difference in requested use).

Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 191, 412 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1980).

The variance, however, was held to be improperly granted in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 191, 412 A.2d 1024, 1029 (1980), and a cease-and-desist order was issued against the Murphys on August 7, 1980.

Finally, the master found that the January 1979 submission was “substantially the same” as that rejected in November and, relying on Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 191, 412 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1980), ruled that the board was justified in disapproving the January 1979 plan because there was no material change in circumstances.