Cited by

Grant- Chase, 140 N.H. at 267 (holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer, and officer testified that request was unambiguous); State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731 (1979) (concluding that defendant’s statement that “he thought he had better talk to an attorney” constituted a sufficient invocation of his right to counsel).

“If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474; see also State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731 (1979).

Accordingly, before statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation may be considered as evidence, the State must *49 prove beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977), that the defendant was warned of his constitutional rights, see State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 730 (1979), and that any subsequent waiver of those rights was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

Miranda warnings advise a defendant of his constitu *77 tional rights, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45; State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731, 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979), and must be administered when an individual is subject to a custodial interrogation by law enforcement agents.

The constitutional right to counsel requires that an individual who has invoked that right be entitled to have an attorney present during police interrogation.

right[] of freedom from self-incrimination.” State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 730-31, 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979).

State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 407 A.2d 365 (1979) (failure to obtain a valid waiver would prevent the police from conducting further interrogation).

Id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444-45; State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731, 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979).

State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 730-31, 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).

We note that if he had done so, and if he had earlier invoked his right to the presence of counsel during interrogation, our holding in State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 407 A.2d 365 (1979) would require the State to prove that any waiver of that right was express, in the sense that the defendant referred expressly to the right or answered a question that referred to it.

are the product of a will overborne by police tactics, see State v. Hamson, 104 N.H. 526, 529, 191 A.2d 89, 91 (1963), or of a mind incapable of a conscious choice, see State v. Goddard, 122 N.H. 471, 446 A.2d 456 (1982); Blackburn v. Alabama supra; cf. State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (1979) (capacity to consent to a search), then the statements are inadmissible at trial.

He was taken to the Franklin police station, where he was advised of his Miranda rights as required under the State and Federal Constitutions.

at 182; see State v. Ball supra; State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 732-33, 407 A.2d 365, 368 (1979).

We hold that, on both occasions, the defendant indicated his lack of understanding of the seriousness of his situation and sufficiently indicated that he was seeking the advice of a lawyer.

If this claim could be substantiated, the State would then have had the burden of proving that the defendant had waived his right to counsel voluntarily, and not as the result of police-initiated custodial interrogation.

He was read the pre-interrogation warnings required by the Federal and State Constitutions, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 730-31, 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979), and the State’s implied consent law, RSA 265:84 and:92.

Although we have ruled upon the admissibility of statements made by an accused during custodial interrogation after he asks to confer with counsel, see, e.g., State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731-33, 407 A.2d 365, 367-68 (1979); State v. Butler, 117 N.H. 888, 890-91, 379 A.2d 827, 829 (1977), we have not previously had the opportunity to apply the rule of Edwards.