Cited by

Shannon, 512 U.S. at 585; State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980).

The State argues that State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 181, 412 A.2d 739, 743 (1980), stands for the proposition that a presumption of vindictiveness will not arise unless the prosecutor seeks a greater punishment after a retrial.

State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980) (“[o]ur system of justice is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the court’s instructions”).

Generally, a witness is required to divulge both name and address on cross-examination in order to prevent prejudice to the defendant ensuing from a “ ‘denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.’ ” State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 184, 412 A.2d 739, 745 (1980) (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)); see Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 12

Upon defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s comment, the trial judge immediately instructed the jury that there was no evidence that the defendant was a junkie, and that they should “ignore [the statement] in reaching whatever verdict you reach.” We assume that the trial court’s instructions are followed by the jury.

Here, the trial court directed the juror not to discuss the voir dire with the other members of the jury; “[o]ur system of justice is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the court’s instructions.” State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980).

We presume that jury members follow the instructions provided by the court, State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 178, 412 A.2d 739, 740 (1980), and we have recognized that appropriate instructions can cure prejudice to the defendant.

“Our system of justice is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the court’s instructions.” State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980) (no abuse of discretion to refuse to poll jury regarding prejudicial publicity, where jury repeatedly admonished not to read or listen to news accounts).

State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980) (“Our system of justice is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the court’s instructions.”).

Rather, any test which measures the capacity of the defendant is a matter of evidence, which falls within the province of the jury to be considered like any other factual issue.

State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 185, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980) (citations omitted).

Consequently, and considering the equivocal nature of the reference to jewelry, we hold that the testimony was not so suggestive of other criminal conduct that the court’s contemporaneous instructions did not cure any possible prejudice to the defendant.

Our jury system is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the trial court’s curative instructions.

We conclude that the defendant has not been denied his constitutional right to a *188 speedy trial.

State v. Preston, 121 N.H. 147, 150, 427 A.2d 32, 34 (1981); State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980).

State v. Preston, 121 N.H. 147, 150, 427 A.2d 32, 34 (1981); State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980).

“The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative and must be considered with regard to the practical administration of justice.” State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 183, 412 A.2d 739, 745 (1980).

*161 State v. Preston, 121 N.H. 147, 150, 427 A.2d 32, 34 (1981); State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980).

We will consider the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the assertion of the right by the defendant, and the prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 186, *151 412 A.2d 739, 746 (1980); State v. Bass, supra at 178, 37 A.2d at 11-12.

Barker v. Wingo, supra at 530-33; State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 182, 412 A.2d 739, 744 (1980).