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Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance, 392 A.2d 576.

37 citing documents.

Explained Elizabeth Skrekas & a. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company & a. N.H. 2017
The trial court dismissed those claims based upon our decision in Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607, 613 (1978), in which we explained that, in New Hampshire, “a breach of contract standing alone does not give rise to a tort action,” but, if “the facts constituting the breach of the contract also constitute a breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff independent of the contract, a separate claim for to
Porter v. City of Manchester 849 A.2d 103 N.H. 2004
“If, however, the facts constituting the breach of the contract also constitute a breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff independent of the contract, a separate claim for tort will lie.” Id.; see also Lawton v. Great Southwest Ins.
Bennett v. ITT Hartford Group, Inc. 846 A.2d 560 N.H. 2004
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Wong v. Ekberg 807 A.2d 1266 N.H. 2002
id, at 757-58; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Bell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 776 A.2d 1260 N.H. 2001
Co., 118 N.H. 607 (1978), and recognize a tort claim for bad faith delay or refusal to settle a first-party insurance claim.
Staffing Network, Inc. v. Pietropaolo 764 A.2d 905 N.H. 2000
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 610, 392 A.2d 576, 578 (1978), when those facts relate to personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must offer affirmative proof.
Miel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 912 P.2d 1333 Ariz. Ct. App. 1996
A.B.C. Builders, Inc. v. American Mutual Insurance 661 A.2d 1187 N.H. 1995
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 610-11, 392 A.2d 576, 579-80 (1978); Windt, supra; B. Ostrager & T. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes § 5.05 (7th ed. 1994).
State v. Springer 574 A.2d 1381 N.H. 1990
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Clearwater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 792 P.2d 719 Ariz. 1990
Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp. 562 A.2d 187 N.H. 1989
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 613, 392 A.2d 576, 580 (1978), the trial court treated the covenant of good faith mentioned in count two as the term said to have been breached under count one, and we will accept that merger of pleading.
Gelinas v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance 551 A.2d 962 N.H. 1988
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Phelps v. Kingston 536 A.2d 740 N.H. 1987
Weld supra; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
PK's Landscaping, Inc. v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. 519 A.2d 285 N.H. 1986
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc. 513 A.2d 951 N.H. 1986
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 613, 392 A.2d 576, 580 (1978); Dunn & Sons, Inc. v. Paragon Homes of New Eng., Inc., 110 N.H. 215, 217, 265 A.2d 5, 8 (1970).
Morvay v. Hanover Insurance Companies 506 A.2d 333 N.H. 1986
“In determining whether the defendant’s motion to dis *725 miss should be granted, all facts properly pleaded are assumed to be true and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed most favorably to the plaintiff.” Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Estate of Younge v. Huysmans 506 A.2d 282 N.H. 1985
“[R]ecovery of damages for mental suffering and emotional distress is not generally permitted in actions arising out of breach of contract.” Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 124 N.H. 814, 817, 474 A.2d 1056, 1057 (1984); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Drop Anchor Realty Trust Charlotte Marshall v. Hartford Fire Insurance 496 A.2d 339 N.H. 1985
Co., 122 N.H. 389, 394, 445 A.2d 1097, 1099 (1982) (quoting Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc. 474 A.2d 1056 N.H. 1984
Co., 122 N.H. 648, 654, 448 A.2d 407, 410 (1982); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
City of Berlin v. State 474 A.2d 1025 N.H. 1984
“In evaluating the propriety of the trial court’s action [in granting a motion to dismiss], we must assume that all the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true and construe all reasonable inferences from those facts favorably to the plaintiff.” Morgenroth & Assoc’s, Inc. v. Town of Tilton, 121 N.H. 511, 516, 431 A.2d 770, 773 (1981) (citing Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Lash v. Cheshire County Savings Bank, Inc. 474 A.2d 980 N.H. 1984
Co., 118 N.H. 607, *440 615, 392 A.2d 576, 581 (1978), and this is in substance a contractual dispute.
Weld Power Industries, Inc. v. C.S.I. Technologies, Inc. 467 A.2d 568 N.H. 1983
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Jarvis v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America 448 A.2d 407 N.H. 1982
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Salem Engineering & Construction Corp. v. Londonderry School District 445 A.2d 1091 N.H. 1982
In Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Company, 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978), this court departed from the traditional rule.
Johnson v. Phenix Mutual Fire Insurance 445 A.2d 1097 N.H. 1982
An insured is entitled to attorney’s fees “if the insurer acted in bad faith in promoting unnecessary litigation.” Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
American Board of Trade, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 444 A.2d 550 N.H. 1982
Sands v. Stevens, 121 N.H. 1008, 1011, 437 A.2d 297, 300 (1981); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Young v. Abalene Pest Control Services, Inc. 444 A.2d 514 N.H. 1982
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 611, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978) (quoting Emery v. Caledonia Sand & Gravel Co., 117 N.H. 441, 446, 374 A.2d 929, 932 (1977)); see Zureas v. Smith, 119 N.H. 534, 538, 404 A.2d 599, 601 (1979).
Robbins v. Seekamp 444 A.2d 537 N.H. 1982
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 610, 392 A.2d 576, 578 (1978), the plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to bring her employer, and as a conse *322 quence her co-employees, under the products liability statute, RSA ch. 507-D.
Sands v. Stevens 437 A.2d 297 N.H. 1981
Co. v. New Hampshire Grey Iron, Inc., 118 N.H. 649, 651, 392 A.2d 145, 146 (1978); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Perkio v. Prunier 436 A.2d 72 N.H. 1981
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Kenneth E. Curran, Inc. v. Auclair Transportation, Inc. 431 A.2d 124 N.H. 1981
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 610, 392 A.2d 576, 578 (1978); accord Evans v. Hall, 118 N.H. 920, 921, 396 A.2d 334, 335 (1980); LaBonte v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 110 N.H. 314, 316, 269 A.2d 634, 636 (1970).
Noble v. National American Life Insurance 624 P.2d 866 Ariz. 1981
Guerin v. New Hampshire Catholic Charities, Inc. 418 A.2d 224 N.H. 1980
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 610, 392 A.2d 576, 578 (1978), we conclude that the *506 source of the duty violated was the implied contract between the defendant and the plaintiffs decedent.
Bertolami v. Merchants Mutual Insurance 414 A.2d 1281 N.H. 1980
Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977); see Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Davis v. First Nat. Bank of Arizona 605 P.2d 37 Ariz. Ct. App. 1979
Noble v. National American Life Insurance 624 P.2d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. 1979
Zareas v. Smith 404 A.2d 599 N.H. 1979
*538 In addition to any loss in value, the seller may be permitted to recover specific consequential damages that “could have been reasonably anticipated by the parties as likely to be caused by the defendant’s breach.” Hurd v. Dunsmore, 63 N.H. 171, 174 (1884); see Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.

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