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“The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that ‘a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in a subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action.’” Eastern Marine Const. Corp. v. First Southern Leasing, 129 N.H. 270, 273, 525 A.2d 709, 711-12 (1987) (quoting Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 252-53, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978)).

Eastern Marine Const. Corp. v. First Southern Leasing, 129 N.H. at 273, 525 A.2d at 711 (quoting Brickner v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 252, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978)).

shed to avoid repetitive litigation so that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an end.” Eastern Marine, supra at 273, 525 A.2d at 711, “a final judgment on the merits in one suit absolutely bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, or their privies, as to all matters which were litigated or might have been litigated in the first suit.” Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds, Eastern M

Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554-55, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1984); Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978).

“Spurred by considerations of judicial economy and a policy of certainty and finality in our legal system, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have been established to avoid repetitive litigation so that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an end.” Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 252, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978) (citing University of New Hampshire v. April, 115 N.H. 576, 578, 347 A.2d 446, 449 (1975); Restatement (Second) of Judgments ch. 3 § 48, Co

Collateral estoppel bars a party from “contesting in a subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action any question or fact actually litigated and determined against [him] in a prior suit.” Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978).

For its modern form, see Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111-12 (1984); Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253-54, 387 A.2d 321, 323-24 (1978).

“Current usage gives the term res judicata a broad meaning covering all the various ways in which a judgment in one action *60 will have a binding effect in another.” Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 252, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978).

Since the second petition covered only police and fire employees, the issue was different from the issue decided under the first petition, and no estoppel arises from the first determination.

Second, the preclusive effect of collateral estoppel extends only to matters that were actually litigated in the earlier case.

Modern usage of the term res judicata is broad, covering all the various ways in which a judgment in one action will have binding effect in another.

Dr. Beyer is now collaterally estopped from relitigating these issues.

However, the present action is not on the contract but rather is one in tort for the intentional interference with a prospective contractual relationship, cf. Daley v. Blood, 121 N.H. 256, 257, 428 A.2d 900, 901 (1981), an action that has been recognized in this State for some time, see Russell v. Croteau, 98 N.H. 68, 69, 94 A.2d 376, 377 (1953), and recently reacknowledged in Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 252, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978); Lumley v. Gye, 1853, 118 Eng.

The bar of res judicata applies not only to those matters actually litigated by the parties but also to those matters that could have been litigated.

of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Cutter v. Town of Durham, 120 N.H. 110, 111, 411 A.2d 1120, 1121 (1980); see Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978).

The trial court, in essence, correctly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

“Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars the same parties, or their privies, from contesting in a subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action any question or fact actually litigated and determined against them in a prior suit.” Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978).

Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits in one suit absolutely bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, or their privies, as to all matters which were litigated, or might have been *444 litigated, in the first suit, absent some extenuating circumstances.” Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 253, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978); accord, Concrete Constructors, Inc. v. The Manchester Bank, 117 N.H. 670, 672, 377 A.2d 612, 614 (1977); Laconia Nat’l Bank v. Lavallee, 96 N.H

Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 387 A.2d 321 (1978); McGrath v. McGrath, 109 N.H. 312, 251 A.2d 336 (1969); Ainsworth v. Claremont supra.