Cited by

Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 122 (1978) (superseded in part on other grounds by statute as recognized in State v. Blair, 143 N.H. 669, 673 (1999)).

Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 125-27 (1978) (reversing case law holding that insanity is an element of the crime, and holding that insanity *33 is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Blair, 143 N.H. 669, 673-74 (1999) (upholding constitutionality of

Although the law presumes “sanity,” see Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 127 (1978), we have not defined it to mean, as a matter of law, that a defendant is aware of his or her actions.

We have previously stated that a jury charged with ascertaining a defendant’s sanity should be instructed about consequences of a “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict because such consequences are not commonly known.

He requested a bifurcated trial.

Prior to trial, he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and waived his right to a bifurcated trial under Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978).

On October 7, 1983, a jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of robbery, whereupon the defense of insanity was submitted to the same jury under the bifurcated trial procedure authorized by Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 123-25, 384 A.2d 124, 128-30 (1978).

Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 127, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (1978); RSA 628:2, II (Supp. 1983); see RSA 626:7, 1(b).

The defendant originally gave notice of intent to plead insanity as a defense, see RSA 628:2, III (Supp. 1983), and requested that the trial be bifurcated for separate determinations of guilt and sanity.

In Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 119, 384 A.2d 124, 126 (1978), we recognized that “[t]he legislature clearly has in mind a separate class when criminal commitment is concerned.” This legislative intent is further evinced by examining the statutory scheme applicable to insanity acquittees.

State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 772-73, 435 A.2d 517, 521 (1981) (entrapment as affirmative defense); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 126-27, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (1978) (insanity as affirmative defense).

denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973); see Kanteles v. Wheelock, 439 F. Supp. 505, 511 (D.N.H.

State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224, 230 (1861), overruled on other grounds in Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 127, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (1978); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979).

It should be noted that we perceive no inconsistency in placing upon the State the burden of proof that the defendant is competent at the time of trial and placing upon the defendant the burden *728 of proof that he was insane at the time of the offense.

He explained, however, that to establish his defense the defendant must only show that it was more likely than not that he was insane at the time of the offense.

Following a bifurcated jury trial in Superior Court (Wyman, J.), he was found to have been sane and *197 guilty of manslaughter.

Under our decision in Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 124-25, 384 A.2d 124, 130 (1978), the defendant had a choice to bifurcate the trial or to join the not-guilty plea with the insanity defense in a single proceeding.

Brock, J. The defendant appeals his conviction for the crime of non-capital first-degree murder (RSA 630:l-a) after a trial bifurcated for separate determination of guilt and sanity.

Memorandum Opinion Defendant asserts that this court erred in the case of Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978), when it concluded that sanity should not be treated as an element of crime to be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, but that insanity should be an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.

Brock, J. After a bifurcated jury trial (see Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978)) in the Cheshire County Superior Court, the defendant was found guilty on three counts: first-degree murder (RSA 630:1-a); robbery while armed with a deadly weapon (RSA 636:1 Ill-a); and conspiracy to commit armed robbery (RSA 629:3).

Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978); Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 380 A.2d 673 (1977); Gibbs v. Helgemoe, 116 N.H. 825, 367 A.2d 1041 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa.

State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1980); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 125, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (1978).

Because insanity is an affirmative defense, Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 127, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (1978), the State is not required to present evidence of the defendant’s sanity in its case in chief but may introduce such evidence in rebuttal after the defense has presented evidence of insanity.

State v. Gregoire, 118 N.H. 140, 384 A.2d 132 (1978); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978); State v. Novosel, 115 N.H. 302, 339 A.2d 16 (1975).

Although no case has required or discussed such a hearing in connection with an involuntary civil commitment proceeding, Michael argues that he is entitled to a bifurcated hearing by analogy to this court’s decision in Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978).

RSA 651:8-a (Supp. 1979); RSA 626:71(b); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 127, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (1978).

Our ruling in Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978), that bifurcation upon request of the defendant is mandatory, is not to be applied retroactively.

generally ABA STANDARDS FOR TRIAL BY JURY § 4.4 (Approved Draft, 1968); cf. Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978) (trial bifurcation); State v. Barker, 117 N.H. 543, 374 A.2d 1179 (1977) (limiting instruction regarding evidence of prior offense).

His petition, therefore, deserves the same close look we gave the commitment proceedings involved in State v. Gregoire, 118 N.H. 140, 384 A.2d 132 (1978); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978); Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 380 A.2d 673 (1977); and Gibbs v. Helgemoe supra.

State v. Gregoire, 118 N.H. 140, 384 A.2d 132 (1978); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978).

Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978); State v. Gregoire, 118 N.H. 140, 384 A.2d 132 (1978); Comment, 11 Harv.

s murder case are whether a court may force a defendant to take medication during trial if he is competent to stand trial only when medicated; whether the defendant may waive his right not to be tried while incompetent by electing while competent to cease taking medication that would continue his competence; and whether the defendant bears the burden of proving insanity under Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978).