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We also “must, wherever possible, adopt the interpretation of an ambiguous clause that will be in harmony with the remainder of the document, so that all provisions will have meaning and effect.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602-03 (1979); see also Sanders v. Insurance Co., 72 N.H. 485, 501 (1904) (concluding, in case involving an insurance policy, that “it appears sufficient to rest the decision upon an interpretation of the contract which gives effect to all its provisions, avoids any confli

Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 604 (1979) (declining to construe contract in manner that leads to harsh and unreasonable results or places one party at the mercy of the other).

In our search for the interpretation that will best reflect the parties’ intention, the court considers the written agreement of these parties, all of its provisions, its subject matter, the situation of the parties at the time, and the object intended.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602 (1979) (citation and quotation omitted).

They contend that “ftjhis court will, where possible, avoid construing a contract in a manner that leads to harsh and unreasonable results or places one party at the mercy of the other.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 604 (1979).

The defendants argue first that exclusion (i) is overly broad and harsh, leaving the policyholder at the mercy of the insurer.

Therefore, we will independently “interpret the contract, using facts found by the trial court.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 117 (1979).

“This court will, where possible, avoid construing a contract in a manner that leads to harsh and unreasonable results or places one party at the mercy of the other.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 604, 406 A.2d 115, 119 (1979).

“This court will, where possible, avoid construing the contract in a manner that leads to harsh and unreasonable results or places one party at the mercy of the other.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 *15 N.H. 598, 604, 406 A.2d 115, 119 (1979).

parties to a contract freely and openly entered into are bound by its terms, Mills v. Nashua Federal Savings and Loan, 121 N.H. 722, 726, 433 A.2d 1312, 1315 (1981), and a court cannot rewrite the contract unless the instrument fails to express the parties’ intentions when they entered into the agreement, see Gosselin v. Archibald, 121 N.H. 1016, 1020, 437 A.2d 302, 306 (1981); Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 603, 406 A.2d 115, 118 (1979).

Thus, where an agreement is ambiguous, and susceptible to different interpretations, a court may search for the interpretation which best reflects the parties’ intention.

Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 603, 406 A.2d 115, 118 (1979) (citing Spear v. Penna, 92 N.H. 190, 27 A.2d 92 (1942)); see also Centronics Data, 129 N.H. at 696, 531 A.2d at 350 (quoting R. Zoppo Co. v. City of Dover, 124 N.H. 666, 671, 475 A.2d 12, 15 (1984)); Gosselin v. Archibald, 121 N.H. 1016, 1020, 437 A.2d 302, 306 (1981); Summit Electr

The general rule applied to non-insurance contracts is that “no presumptions are to be indulged in either for or against a party who draws an agreement.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 118 (1979) (quoting Aldrich v. Beauregard & Sons, 105 N.H. 330, 336, 200 A.2d 14, 18 (1964)).

It is axiomatic that we give a contract the meaning intended by the parties when they wrote it.

We assume “that the words used [in the lease] were used advisedly and for the purpose of conveying some meaning.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 603, 406 A.2d 115, 118 (1979).

In reviewing a contract we will give its language the interpretation that best reflects the parties’ intentions.

The language of a written contract will be given the interpretation that best reflects the parties’ intentions.

Erin Food Servs., Inc. v. 688 Props., 119 N.H. 232, 235, 401 A.2d 201, 203 (1979); Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 603, 406 A.2d 115, 118 (1979).

We have consistently held that “[i]t is this court’s task to interpret the contract, using facts found by the trial court.” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 117 (1979).

A court must consider not only the written instrument but also the situation of the parties.

In our search for the interpretation that will best reflect the parties’ intention, the court considers ‘the written agreement of [the] parties, all of its provisions, its subject matter, the situation of the parties at the time, and the object intended.’ ” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 117-18 (1979), quoting Griswold v. Heat, Inc., 108 N.H. 119, 123, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (1967).

This case, however, involves a factual dispute as to the terms of the contract, which is properly resolved by the finder of fact, rather than a question of interpretation of terms not in dispute, which would be a question for this court.

In interpreting a contract the court is to consider the written agreement, all its provisions, its subject matter, the situation of the parties at the time it was entered into and the object intended.

Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 118 (1979); Aldrich v. Charles Beauregard & Sons, 105 N.H. 330, 336, 200 A.2d 14, 18 (1964).

Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 117 (1979); Murray v. Peabody, 106 N.H. 319, 324, 211 A.2d 855, 859 (1965).

Robinson v. Weitz, 171 Conn. 545, 551, 370 A.2d 1066, 1069 (1976); see Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 117 (1979).