Cited by

MACDONALD, C.J. In Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979), we held that a plaintiff need not be in the zone of danger to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

In New Hampshire, a bystander’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress must meet the requirements set out in Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979).

Since 1979, we have relied upon the traditional tort concepts of foreseeability and causation when confronted with this issue.

Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 650 (1979); Jelly v. LaFlamme, 108 N.H. 471 (1968); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174 (1950).

at 304; see also Chiuchiolo, 84 N.H. at 337-38; Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 652-53 (1979).

See, e.g., Manchenton, 135 N.H. 298, 605 A.2d 208; Goodwin, 134 N.H. 579, 595 A.2d 504; Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979).

The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.” Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (1979) (quotation omitted).

New Hampshire did not afford a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress under facts such as those in this case before 1979.

foreseeability are inextricably bound together.” Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (1979).

It provides that “[a] person may be liable ‘only to those who are foreseeably endangered by [his] conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous.’” Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (1979) (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 1018 (1956)).

Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651-52, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (1979); Chiuchiolo v. New England &c. Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 337, 150 A. 540, 544 (1930).

The accepted standards for recovery in this area of the law have evolved over the years, and part of the rationale underlying each new standard has been the public policy objective of preventing unlimited and burdensome liability.

While we do not lightly overrule prior opinions, Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 658, 406 A.2d 300, 307 (1979), an unnecessary burden on trial judges impedes the ends of justice.

Although our holding does not require us to do so, we wish to make the observation that any future appeals on negligent infliction of emotional distress will have to address the issues of physical impact for liability purposes, and physical manifestation of emotional injuries for recovery purposes, if appropriate, as discussed in the following two cases: Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979) and Chiuchiolo v. New England &c. Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930).

Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 213, 469 A.2d 1299, 1302 (1983) (annotated in 49 A.L.R.4th 1 (1983)); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979).

“Duty and foreseeability are inextricably bound together.” Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (1979).

In Count II, Linda seeks damages, under the parental bystander doctrine enunciated in Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979), for the emotional injury, including depression, attributable to the impact of her observation of Heather’s defects at and after Heather’s birth.

Lack of any such physical manifestations precludes a finding that the physical discomfort and emotional pain and suffering complained of here can rise to the level of “bodily injury” as defined in the policy.

Batchelder, J. The issue before us is whether the rule we enunciated in Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979), has retroactive effect.

The plaintiffs concede that, to find a cause of action in this case, we must expand the boundary of liability for negligent infliction of emotional harm that we set out in Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 657-59, 406 A.2d 300, 306-08 (1979).

Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 654, 406 A.2d 300, 304-05 (1979); see also Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 138 Cal.

‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’” Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 651, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (1979) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.

In support of this argument, she relies upon the Corso case, in which this court recently recognized the right of parents to recover damages for the emotional distress resulting from their contemporaneous perception of a serious accident in which their child was injured.

The plaintiffs never consulted a physician with regard to their alleged suffering, and the master ruled that Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 653, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (1979), barred their claim because it required such injury to be “susceptible to some form of objective *874 medical determination and proved through qualified medical witnesses.” We hold that Corso is not applicable in this context, see Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.