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“Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient’s confidence or he cannot help him.” In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 386 (1979) (quotation *665 omitted), superseded on other grounds as recognized by In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 123-24 (1993).

Our case law supports disclosure of privileged and relevant medical records when: (1) a statute specifically authorizes disclosure, see In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 384-86 (1979) (superseded on other grounds as recognized by In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119 (1993)); (2) a sufficiently compelling countervailing consideration is identified, see Elwell, 132 N.H. *441 at 606; In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. at 382, 385; or (3) disclosure is essential under the specific circumstances of th

In support of this argument, he cites In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 402 A.2d 169 (1979), in which this court held that “[gjiven the danger of unwarranted or harmful intrusion into family life,...

Statutory privileges should be strictly construed, In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 385, 402 A.2d 169, 171 (1979), according to the common and approved usage of language, State v. Hart, 130 N.H. 325, 326, 540 A.2d 859, 859 (1988); RSA 21:2.

State v. LaRoche supra; In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 385, 402 A.2d 169, 171 (1979).

Thus we have held that relevant communications remain privileged for purposes other than recommitment hearings, Kupchun, supra at 416, 373 A.2d at 1327-28; that district courts must balance probative value against damage to the therapeutic relationship in deciding whether to admit privileged matters in child-abuse and neglect cases, In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 386-87, 402 A.2d 169, 172-73 (1979); and that, in examining a witness, a criminal defendant may use only those privileged matters “ess

The court is entitled to “the best information available” in deciding whether and when a child should be returned to its parents.

In re Doe, 123 N.H. 634, 465 A.2d 925 (1953); In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 402 A.2d 169 (1979).

As we have recognized, “[t]he real purpose of any privilege is not to exclude relevant evidence, but simply to facilitate activities which require confidence.” In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 387, 402 A.2d 169, 173 (1979) (quoting McNamara, The Hierarchy of Evidentiary Privilege in New Hampshire, 20 N.H.B.J.

In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 385, 402 A.2d 169, 171 (1979) (statutory privileges *502 relating to confidential communications between physician-patient and psychologist-client are strictly construed).

Statutory privileges must be strictly construed.

ld have been so greatly altered that there is a strong possibility the child will be harmed if he continues to live under the present arrangement.” The defendant argues that the division of welfare as custodian of the children has the burden of proving either beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Robert H. _, 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978), or by clear and convincing evidence, In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 402 A.2d 169 (1979), that the mother of the children should be denied custody.

In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 798, 424 A.2d 178, 182 (1980); In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 388-89, 402 A.2d 169, 174 (1979); State v. Robert H. _, supra at 716, 393 A.2d at 1389.

In re Fay G., 120 N.H. 153, 156, 412 A.2d 1012, 1015 (1980); see In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 388-89, 402 A.2d 169, 173-74 (1979).

Even in the case of a neglect proceeding, in which this court has held the standard of proof to be “by clear and convincing evidence,” it was also held that psychiatric evidence, including testimony of a treating psychiatrist, would be admissible notwithstanding a claim of statutory privilege because without this evidence “the State [would] be unable to bear its burden of proof.” In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 402 A.2d 169 (1979).