Cited by

Subsequent cases involving the physician-patient and 14 psychotherapist-patient privileges have further muddled the analysis by citing McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758 (1979), an attorney-client privilege case2 that is itself troubling.

It noted our statement that the attorney-client privilege “may not be absolute when there is a compelling need for the information and no alternative source is available.” McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 (1979).

Records of C.T.), 160 N.H. 214, 225 (2010), and the attorney-client privilege, see McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 (1979), adopted an “essential need” standard.

rmation concerned is considered essential.” (quotation omitted)); Elwell, 132 N.H. at 605-06 (although “the physician-patient privilege is not absolute and will yield when the disclosure of information is essential,” where other sources of information are available, the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, though compelling, is not grounds for piercing the privilege); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 (1979) (“The attorney-client privilege may not be absolute when there is a compell

In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. at 385; McGranahan v. Dakar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 (1979).

McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764, 408 A.2d 121, 125 (1979); Law Off.

It is well-settled in New Hampshire that “certain communications are absolutely privileged and therefore immune from civil suit.” Pickering v. Frink, 123 N.H. 326, 328, 461 A.2d 117, 119 (1983); see McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 762-63, 408 A.2d 121, 124 (1979).

The Valley News correctly notes that we implicitly recognized the substance of the fair report privilege in McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 408 A.2d 121 (1979).

We note that there are occasions in which even the most sacred of privileges must fall, such as when there is no available alternative source for the information and there is a “compelling need for the information.” McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764, 408 A.2d 121, 125 (1979); see State v. Whittey, 134 N.H. 736, 739, 599 A.2d 117, 119 (1991).

See, e.g., Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 109, 534 A.2d 720, 722 (1987) (patient partially waives physician-patient privilege by putting medical condition at issue in medical negligence suit); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764, 408 A.2d 121, 125 (1979) (attorney-client privilege may not be absolute when “there is a compelling need for the information and no alternative source is available”).

The purpose of a judicial proceeding is to test the truth or falsity of allegations of criminal or wrongful conduct.” McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 762, 408 A.2d 121, 124 (1979).

McGranahan v. Dakar, 119 N.H. 758, 768, 771-72, 408 A.2d 121, 128, 129-30 (1979) (setting forth some, but not all, elements of abuse of process; elements of “wrongful civil proceedings” outlined); Amabello v. Colonial Motors, 117 N.H. 556, 558, 374 A.2d 1182, 1183-84 (1977) (discussing definition of “process,” but not delineating other elements of t

This is consistent with the attorney-client privilege, which will also yield when there is a compelling need for otherwise privileged information.

14, 27, 551 P.2d 334, 347 (1976); McGranahan v. Dakar, 119 N.H. 758, 764, 408 A.2d 121, 125 (1979) (“The attorney-client privilege may not be absolute when there is a compelling need for the information and no alternative source is available”).

McGrana *329 han v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 762, 408 A.2d 121, 124 (1979); 50 Am.