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I. The Defamation Claims In order to be actionable, the language complained of must be defamatory in the sense that it must tend to lower the plaintiff in the esteem of any substantial and respectable group.

Furthermore, to be actionable for defamation, the challenged statement must be capable of communicating a defamatory meaning.

If the defendant’s statements concerning a public official are true, they are protected by the First Amendment.

trier of facts.” Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 376 (1979) (brackets and ellipsis omitted).

If defamation is established and no privilege applies, the plaintiff may seek damages for harm to his or her reputation.

If defamation is established and no privilege applies, the plaintiff may seek damages for harm to his or her reputation.

It is true, of course, that this jury issue, like any other, always presents a threshold question of law, whether any reasonable trier of fact could find a given plaintiff to be a public official, see Baer v. Rosenblatt supra, or could find him to be anything else, see Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 376-77, 402 A.2d 651, 655 (1979) (Governor obviously a public official).

At trial the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable by proving that readers of the editorial had in fact understood it in these defamatory senses.

denied, 454 U.S. 1017 (1981); Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 378, 402 A.2d 651, 656 (1979); Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. at 277, 293 A.2d at 769.

The pertinent documents are to be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

To be libelous, language must be defamatory; that is, “it must tend to lower the plaintiff ‘in the esteem of any substantial and respectable group, even though it may be quite a small minority.’ ” Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 373, 402 A.2d 651, 653 (1979) (quoting W. Prosser, Torts § 111, at 743 (4th ed. 1971)).

We reinforced this position in Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 378, 402 A.2d 651, 656 (1979).

Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 374, 402 A.2d 651, 653 (1979); see Good Government Group v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.

RSA 491:8-a (Supp. 1979); see Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 402 A.2d 651 (1979); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).

Therefore, the matter can rarely be disposed of on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.