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The plaintiff urges us to review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion or error of law, the standard of review we use *438 when reviewing a trial court’s determination of property division.

We will not overturn the trial judge’s decision to award attorney’s fees in a divorce proceeding absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.

We will set aside a property division only where a party can demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion.

The defendant attempts to rely for support on our analysis in Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 401 A.2d 1057 (1979).

In matters of property settlement and divorce, we allocate broad discretion to the trial court, Economides v. Economides, 116 N.H. 191, 193, 357 A.2d 871, 872 (1976), and will set aside its determinations of property division only where the appealing party can demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion.

Because this case was decided before Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 497 A.2d 1187 (1985), the trial court was not required to make specific findings justifying any unequal division, and the order will be sustained if it can be found equitable on the total record.

We have construed this to mean that, while property must be distributed equitably, it need not always be distributed equally.

Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269 (1983); Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979).

The consideration of these economic factors aids the master in his task of devising an equitable distribution of the marital assets.

Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979); Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 656, 392 A.2d 148, 150 (1978); see Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507-08, 272 A.2d 586, 587-88 (1970).

Marital property “is to be distributed equitably, but not necessarily equally.” MacDonald v. MacDonald, 122 N.H. at 342, 443 A.2d at *857 1018; Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979).

“The fact that the master’s recommendation did not conform in all respects to an offer made by one of the parties during prolonged litigation does not constitute an abuse of discretion.” Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979).

Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979) (quoting Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 656, 392 A.2d 148, 150 (1978)).

We have previously held that a closely held business should not be divided where one party was primarily involved with the business and had devoted substantial time and toil to its growth and maintenance.

Goudreault v. Goudreault, 120 N.H. 140, 140, 412 A.2d 736, 736 (1980); Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 270, 401 A.2d 1058 -59 (1979); Hunneyman v. Hunneyman, 118 N.H. 652, 652-53, 392 A.2d 147, 148 (1978); Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 655, 392 A.2d 148, 149 (1978).

Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979); Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 656, 392 A.2d 148, 150 (1978); see Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 508, 272 A.2d 586, 587-88 (1970).

Once the article in question is found to be properly within a party’s estate, the trial court has broad discretion in determining and ordering an equitable distribution of that property.

Grandmaison v. *356 Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 401 A.2d 1057 (1979); Hamblett v. Lewis, 114 N.H. 258, 319 A.2d 629 (1974).

Symmes v. Symmes, 118 N.H. 488, 490, 387 A.2d 1181, 1182 (1978); Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 270, 401 A.2d 1057, 1058-59 (1979).

See, e.g., Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 401 A.2d 1057 (1979); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1979).

The business records support defendant’s testimony that his business at that time was “very productive.” He hoped that the company would prosper, although he did not believe that it would to the extent “where I’m making fifty thousand dollars again this year.” In the present case, a review of the record does not show that the master abused his discretion by awarding the amount that he did.