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We are also not persuaded by the defendant’s attempt to analogize his case to State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912 (1978), in which we observed that the record failed to “demonstrate that the defendant waived his Miranda rights,” but, rather, “only suggest[ed] that the defendant understood his rights.” Gullick, 118 N.H. at 915.

“Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915 (1978) (quotation omitted).

To aid us in reviewing a trial court’s determination of waiver, we have required trial courts to “enter an express finding that the waiver (and any confession) was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915 (1978).

State v. Zurita, 133 N.H. 719, 724, 584 A.2d 758, 761 (1990); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 146, 370 A.2d 1153, 1153 (1977).

For example, we require proof of a waiver to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Derby, 131 N.H. 760, 761, 561 A.2d 504, 504 (1989); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978), and we have established special rules for evaluating waivers by juveniles, State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 17-19, 490 A.2d 295, 302-04 (1985).

The burden of proof in the habeas proceeding would devolve in fact upon the State, just as it rests in law upon the State in any true suppression hearing, see State v. Palamia, 124 N.H. 333, 336, 470 A.2d 906, 907-08 (1983) (to justify admitting fruits of warrantless arrest); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978) (to show post -Miranda waiver); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 146, 370 A.2d 1153, 1153 (1977) (to show voluntariness of statement); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 43

State v. Sullivan, 130 N.H. 64, 68, 534 A.2d 384, 386 (1987); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555-56 (1978).

Although this court held in State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978) that Miranda warnings and waiver must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when necessary to establish the admissibility of a defendant’s statement, cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986) (proof by preponderance sufficient under National Constitution), Gulliek does not requ

State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978); cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986) (proof by preponderance adequate under National Constitution).

[voluntarily,] *343 knowingly and intelligently waived [his Miranda] rights.” State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978).

*68 Both the defendant and the State concede that under State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153 (1977) and State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 396 A.2d 554 (1978), the State’s burden is to prove voluntariness in the waiver and in the statement “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Phinney, we rejected the United States Supreme Court’s “preponderance of the evidence” standard to show that the confession was voluntary because “[t]he stakes are too high and the ri

Although Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986), has recently held that the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence, the State has not challenged the applicability of State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978), holding that the State must carry its burden by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Superior Court (Dalianis, J.) denied both motions, finding that the consent to search the property was voluntarily given and was not revoked and that the defendant’s statement had met the voluntary waiver standard set out in State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 556 (1978).

State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 667-68, 377 A.2d 608, 611 (1977); see also State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 556 (1978).

The defendant is entitled to relief, however, under his third assignment of error, that the trial court violated the requirement of State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 556 (1978): “the *497 trial court, at a suppression hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of an oral or written waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights, is hereafter required to enter an express finding that the waiver (and any confession) was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial jud

State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 396 A.2d 554 (1978); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153 (1977).

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been warned of his Miranda rights.

State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 146, 370 A.2d 1153, 1153 (1977).

State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978); see State v. Perkins, 121 N.H. 713, 715, 435 A.2d 504, 505 (1981).

He is correct that in Gullick we instructed our trial courts to “enter an express finding that the waiver [of rights] (and any confession) was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 556 (1978).

generally State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 396 A.2d 554 (1978) (waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt).

Moreover, our review of the record reveals that there was more than sufficient evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this confession was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently by the defendant.

State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 396 A.2d 554 (1978); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153 (1977).