Cited by

RSA 173-B:9, III (2022); State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 841-43 (1978).

See, e.g., State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978) (establishing a model jury instruction regarding the reasonable doubt standard and cautioning “trial judges to avoid attempts at further defining reasonable doubt”); State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 635-38 (1980) (concluding that the trial court’s reasonable doubt charge, which added language to the charg

However, if you find that the State has proved all of the elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant guilty.

He also argues that when a defendant argues nullification, as the trial court allowed the defendant to do in this case, the court may not in its instructions contravene or undermine the nullification defense by giving the standard Wentworth instruction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978), or by instructing the jury that if the lawyers state the law differently from the court’s instructions, the jury must follow the court’s instructions and ignore the lawyer’s statements.

State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 839 (1978) (emphasis added).

Second, he argues that the trial court provided an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction to the jury when it modified the standard instruction set forth in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978).

The pertinent legal propositions as to which the jury must be instructed in a criminal case include the presumption that the defendant is innocent and the requirement that the State bear the burden of proving each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is well established that the model charge set forth in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978), “provides the equivalent of a jury nullification instruction.” State v. Sanchez, 152 N.H. 625, 629 (2005).

*634 State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1979) (exercising supervisory jurisdiction to suggest that trial courts use model charge regarding burden of proof and the definition of “reasonable doubt”).

Defense counsel averred that he had been present at prior orientations during which the presiding justice gave an instruction on reasonable doubt which deviated from the Wentworth model, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832 (1978), and referenced the type of evidence that may be presented at trial.

The trial court ordinarily gives the Wentworth instruction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 (1978), which provides the equivalent of a jury nullification instruction.

(evidentiary rule) (quoting State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 (1978) (jury instruction)) (internal brackets and ellipses omitted).

In this case, the trial court considered the traditional goals of sentencing when it determined the defendant’s sentence.

The trial court considered the traditional goals of sentencing — punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation — in crafting the sentence.

The defendant first contends the trial court should have repeated the Wentworth charge given at the conclusion of trial.

In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189, 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356, 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838, 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681, 3

While the trial court ordinarily gives the Wentworth instruction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1979), which provides the equivalent of a jury nullification instruction, see Bonacorsi, 139 N.H. at 30-31, 648 A.2d at 470, the decision to give a more specific instruction on nullification lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

To establish Steed’s guilt, the State had to prove that he knew he was not licensed or privileged to enter the victim’s driveway.

is a necessary incident to the exercise of judicial power inherent in the functioning of the court system.”); State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838, 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978); cf RSA 490:4 (1983).

instruct those courts” on this troublesome issue.

At the conclusion of the defendant’s trial, the trial court gave the jury the usual instructions including the Wentworth instruction on reasonable doubt and burden of proof.

The trial court twice followed with an instruction to the jury that if it found the State had proved all the elements of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, it “may” find the defendant guilty.

We find that the trial court adequately responded to the defendant’s request for a nullification charge when it noted that it was prepared to give the jury a so-called “reasonable doubt Wentworth Charge.” See State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 860 (1978) (setting forth model jury charge on burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt).

This argument, however, is without merit, because the judge’s instruction included the language of the Wentworth charge, which states that if the State has proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should find the defendant guilty.

On appeal, he argues that the Trial Court’s {Pappagianis, J.) charge to the jury on reasonable doubt deviated significantly from the model instruction delineated in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978), and therefore should automatically require reversal of the convictions and a new trial.

State v. Wenttoorth, 118 N.H. 832, 835, 395 A.2d 858, 860 (1978); R. McNamara, 1 New Hampshire Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 703 (1980).

In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that it should find the defendant guilty of first degree murder if the State met its burden.

State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978); see State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 590, 467 A.2d 202, 214 (1983) (jury not bound by evidence, but can accept or reject evidence in whole or in part).

Finally, he argues that the court improperly failed to instruct the jury that it should return a verdict of not guilty if it did not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly engaged in sexual penetration with a person who was less than thirteen years old, when the court instructed the jury that it should return a guilty verdict if it did so find.

This discretion, however, is not unlimited.

He explained to the jury that the special findings form was analogous to “painting by the numbers.” In State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 860 (1978), this court prepared a model charge on the State’s burden of proof and recommended that trial court judges use the model without adding to the definition of reasonable doubt.

We find the instruction objectionable for the further reason that it can be read as a subtle modification of the standard reasonable doubt charge mandated for use by State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978).

Compare State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978) (defendants in criminal cases are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) with State v. Barrels of Liquor, 47 N.H. 369, 375 (1867) (burden of proof in a forfeiture proceeding is proof by a preponderance of the evidence).

“Rehabilitation, which in the modern sense of the word includes counseling and training, is not a constitutional requirement.” State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 842, 395 A.2d 858, 865 (1978).

The model instruction recommended by this court states that the defendant “should” be found guilty if the State has proven its *239 case, not that he or she must be.

State v. Dumont, 122 N.H. 866, 451 A.2d 1286 (1982); State v. Peabody, 121 N.H. 1075, 1078, 438 A.2d 305, 307 (1981); State v. Wheeler, 120 N.H. 496, 416 A.2d 1384 (1980); State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 395 A.2d 858 (1978); cf, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (in applying one of three factors to be considered under eighth amendment proportionality test, the Court stated: “If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but that “[i]t is not necessary that each fact relied on by the State be established for you beyond a reasonable doubt.” The defendant argues that this instruction constitutes an addition to our model charge on reasonable doubt, in violation of State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978).

In charging the jury on reasonable doubt, the court gave the instruction prescribed in State v. Wentworth, 118 *488 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978).

at 499, 416 A.2d at 1386; State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 843, 395 A.2d 858, 865 (1978).

The defendant’s next argument involves the issue whether the reasonable doubt language of the model burden-of-proof instruction contained in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978), was vitiated by the court’s following statement: “It is of utmost importance that no person who is guilty should go free, and, likewise, it is equally important that no person who is innocent should be convicted.” In determining whether an instruction violates the Wentworth parad

The trial court in this case instructed the jury by using the model charge on reasonable doubt that was set forth in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978), and no more was required.

State v. Peabody, 121 N.H. 1075, 1078, 438 A.2d 305, 307 (1981); State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 843, 395 A.2d 858, 865 (1978); see Benton v. Dist.

At the time, no claim was made that the court’s instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant or in any way violated the requirements imposed by State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978).

State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 841, 395 A.2d 858, 864 (1973) (citations omitted).

We note at the outset that this issue would not have arisen if the trial court had followed the model instruction which we set forth, almost three years ago, in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838- *1068 39, 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978).

In State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 843, 395 A.2d 858, 865 (1979), we said: “[W]e recognize that, as defendant argues, the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments might be violated by sentences which are grossly disproportionate to the crime, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584

In State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 842, 395 A.2d 858, 865 (1978), we made it clear that rehabilitation, in the modern sense of the word, is not a constitutional right or requirement.

Although the judge’s charge might arguably have limited the definition of “privilege,” taken as a whole the jury charge was not prejudicial to the defendant.

The first paragraph of the court’s instruction is virtually identical to the reasonable doubt definition delineated in the model charge suggested by this court in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 395 A.2d 858 (1978), and upheld by the federal court in Tsoumas v. State of New Hampshire, 611 F.2d 412 (1st Cir. 1980).

We specifically approved similar language in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838, 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978).