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Although consent searches have long been an acceptable method of law enforcement, we have previously admonished that it is good policy for police officers to advise persons that they have a right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search.

“In the case of a consensual search, the State must show from all the surrounding circumstances that the consent given was free, knowing, and voluntary.” State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979).

Given the defendant’s response, it appears that there was ample evidence from which the court could conclude that ‘“the consent given [to go to the motel room] was free, knowing and voluntary.’” State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 105, 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983) (quoting State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979)).

We will not, therefore, disturb the court’s decision unless it is plainly wrong.

at 105-06, 467 A.2d at 574, that the consent was ‘free, knowing, and voluntary.’ State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979).” State v. Jones, 131 N.H. 726, 728, 560 A.2d 1159, 1160 (1989).

at 105-06, 467 A.2d at 574, that the consent was “free, knowing, and voluntary.” State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979).

State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 431, 402 A.2d 493, 496 (1979) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)).

State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 105, 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983); State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979); State v. Laro, 106 N.H. 500, 503, 213 A.2d 909, 911 (1965); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973).

In construing the State Constitution, we refer to Federal constitutional law as only the benchmark of minimum constitutional protection.

If the statements are the product of a will overborne by police tactics, see State v. Hamson, 104 N.H. 526, 529, 191 A.2d 89, 91 (1963), or of a mind incapable of a conscious choice, see State v. Goddard, 122 N.H. 471, 446 A.2d 456 (1982); Blackburn v. Alabama supra; cf. State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (1979) (capacity to consent to a search), then the statements are inadmissible at trial.

This court has consistently recognized that in a given situation “[o]ur [State] constitution often will afford greater protection against the action of the State than does the Federal constitution.” State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 217, 447 A.2d 1284, 1285 (1982); see, e.g., State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (1979); State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 264, 385 A.2d 844, 845 (1978).

State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 217, 447 A.2d 1284, 1285 (1982); State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (1979); State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 264, 385 A.2d 844, 845 (1978).

Where the State seeks to justify a warrantless search by alleging that the defendant consented, “the State must show from all the surrounding circumstances that the consent given was free, knowing and voluntary.” State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 498 (1979).

Tsoumas’ expert testified that in her opinion Tsoumas had authored the signatures of “William Smith.” We have held that the weight and credence to be given to the evidence at trial is the very essence of a jury’s function.

Because the defendant knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the car and the seizure of his gun, the search and seizure were lawful and the gun was properly admitted into evidence.

In State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 402 A.2d 493 (1979), we stated that “this court [can] impose a heavier burden on the State under the New Hampshire Constitution.

State v. Hardy, 120 N.H. at 554, 419 A.2d at 400; State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 436, 402 A.2d 493, 499 (1979).

To be effective, defense counsel must perform “within the range of competence required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases.” State v. Fleury, 111 N.H. 294, 299, 282 A.2d 873, 877 (1971) (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1979)) (reaffirmed in State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 436, 402 A.2d 493, 499 (1979)).

Although this court is free to require that a person be informed of his right to withhold his consent, we are not prepared to do so at this time.

This rule enables trial judges to consider alleged errors and to take remedial measures when necessary.

The State correctly argues that this court, State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (1979), and the United States Supreme Court, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 234, have held that knowledge of a right to refuse entrance is not a prerequisite to voluntary consent.

State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 402 A.2d 493 (1979); see Arkansas v. Sanders, 99 S.Ct.

We recently reaffirmed our exception requirement, State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 402 A.2d 493 (1979); State v. Boisvert, 119 N.H. 174, 400 A.2d 48 (1979), and will continue to apply the rule.