Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Heston v. Ousler, 398 A.2d 536.

16 citing documents.

Michael Sklader & a. v. Richard Callahan N.H. 2025
In Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58 (1979), we “adopt[ed] a rule of reasonable use as the guidepost in adjudging the permissible exercise of a shorefront owner’s littoral rights.” Heston, 119 N.H. at 62.
Alan Armstrong & a. v. Maria Giakoumakis & a. N.H. 2018
Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 62-63 (1979) (affirming that defendant’s dock encroached upon plaintiffs’ common law littoral property rights when it was located at angle so as to be directly in front of plaintiffs’ waterfront); see Milne v. Burlington Homes, Inc., 117 N.H. 813, 815 (1977) (stating division between law and equity is not precise and
J. Albert Lynch v. Town of Pelham 167 N.H. 14 N.H. 2014
Joslin, 116 N.H. at 817; Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 63 (1979).
Morrissey v. Town of Lyme 37 A.3d 414 N.H. 2011
Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 61 (1979) (upholding master’s finding that defendants’ dock constituted a nuisance where the dock completely obscured the plaintiffs’ view of the water and “created a safety hazard for the plaintiffs when swimming within their own water space”); Sundell v. Town of New London, 119 N.H. 839, 843, 844 (1979) (littoral o
Tarbell Administrator, Inc. v. City of Concord 956 A.2d 322 N.H. 2008
Thus, in this case, where Tarbell alleges that the City’s actions in creating a private nuisance, see Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 60-61 (1979), and intentionally trespassing upon the property amount to a physical taking of the property, cf. Gilman, 55 N.H. at 137-38, discretionary function immunity does not bar these claims.
Red Hill Outing Club v. Hammond 722 A.2d 501 N.H. 1998
“We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the trier of fact if it is supported by the evidence, especially when he has been assisted in reaching his conclusions by a view.” Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 60, 398 A.2d 536, 537 (1979).
Gephart v. Daigneault 623 A.2d 1349 N.H. 1993
First, we note that “we have rejected the traditional policy of strictly construing [restrictive covenants],” Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 63, 398 A.2d 536, 539 (1979); see also Joslin v. Pine River Dev.
Dudley v. Beckey 567 A.2d 573 N.H. 1989
N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 779, 533 A.2d 351, 353 (1987) (citing Heston v. Ouster, 119 N.H. 58, 60, 398 A.2d 536, 537 (1979)).
New Hampshire Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris 533 A.2d 351 N.H. 1987
This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact if it is supported by the evidence, particularly when the trier of fact has bolstered his conclusions with a view.
Delaney v. Gurrieri 451 A.2d 394 N.H. 1982
Cote v. Eldeen, 119 N.H. at 494, 403 A.2d at 420; Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 60, 398 A.2d 536, 537 (1979).
Dunlop v. Daigle 444 A.2d 519 N.H. 1982
Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 60, 398 A.2d 536, 537 (1979); Piecuch v. Manchester, 114 N.H. 8, 9, 314 A.2d 642, 643 (1974); Robie v. Lillis, 112 N.H. 492, 495-96, 299 A.2d 155, 158-59 (1972); Ferguson v. Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 410, 238 A.2d 1, 2 (1967); True v. McAlpine, 81 N.H. 314, 315, 125 A. 680, 681 (1924).
Cricenti v. Bewley 415 A.2d 675 N.H. 1980
Heston v. Ouster, 119 N.H. 58, 62, 398 A.2d 536, 539 (1979); Sargent Lake Ass’n. v. Dane, 118 N.H. 720, 722, 393 A.2d 559, 561 (1978).
Sundell v. Town of New London 409 A.2d 1315 N.H. 1979
Hoban v. Bucklin supra; State v. Stafford Company supra; Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 398 A.2d 536 (1979).
Olszak v. Peerless Insurance 406 A.2d 711 N.H. 1979
Cote v. Eldeen, 119 N.H. 491, 403 A.2d 419 (1979); Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 398 A.2d 536 (1979).
Cote v. Eldeen 403 A.2d 419 N.H. 1979
*494 Sakansky v. Wein, 86 N.H. 337, 339, 169 A. 1, 2 (1933) (citations omitted); see Heston v. Ouster, 119 N.H. 58, 398 A.2d 536 (1979).
Donaghey v. Croteau 401 A.2d 1081 N.H. 1979
Heston v. Ousler, 119 N.H. 58, 389 A.2d 536 (1979); Clement v. Burns, 43 N.H. 609, 617 (1862).