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is not a legal justification for agency non-compliance with [a] legislative command.” See In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 773, 776 (1978) (declining to “accept the State’s argument that its inability to find guardians excuses it from performing the legislative mandate” to “obtain and nominate guardians” for patients at NHH and residents of the Laconia State School).

These safeguards are needed considering the potentially adversarial nature of guardianship proceedings, see, e.g., In re DeLucca, 121 N.H. 71, 72 (1981), and the significance of the liberties and rights at stake, see, e.g., In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 775 (1978) (“A person who is legally declared incompetent is substantially deprived of liberty.

A specific law controls a specific case over a general law.

“Normally the expression of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another.” In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 777, 394 A.2d 308, 311 (1978).

In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 777, 394 A.2d 308, 311 (1978) (citing Vaillancourt v. Concord Gen.

The collateral argument for waiver strikes us as comparably short-sighted in failing to recognize that, regardless of what Mrs. Watkins may or may not have told K during their telephone conversation, the statute explicitly provides that a hospital’s governing board may waive the privilege, see RSA 151:13-a, III (Supp. 1988), with the obvious negative implication that no one else may do so.

Due process protections apply where, as in a detention hearing, an individual faces a potential deprivation of liberty.

See, e.g., In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 777, 394 A.2d 308, 311 (1978).

In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 777, 394 A.2d 308, 311 (1978); 2A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 47.23-.24 (4th ed. C. Sands rev. 1984).

This is consistent with our often-stated rule “that a specific law controls in a specific case over a general law.” In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 777, 394 A.2d 308, 311 (1978).

In re Eva S., 121 N.H. 847, 850-51, 435 A.2d 838, 840-41 (1981); In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 776-77, 394 A.2d 308, 311 (1978); see also Juvenile Case #1089, 119 N.H. 64, 66, 398 A.2d 65, 67 (1979).

I, art. 15; see In re Gamble, 118 N.H 771, 775, 394 A.2d 308, 309-10 (1978); State v. Gregoire, 118 N.H 140, 142-44, 384 A.2d 132, 133 (1978).

Because the intent of the legislature is plainly enunciated in the words of these statutes, RSA 604-A:1 and RSA 169-C:27 (Supp. 1979), see In re Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 777, 394 A.2d 308, 311 (1978) (“[A] specific law controls in a specific case over a general law.”), we need not investigate their legislative histories to divine their meaning.

The enumeration of certain elements in a statute implies the exclusion of those not enumerated.

Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.

Juvenile Case #1089, 119 N.H. 64, 398 A.2d 65 (1979): In *226 the Matter of Albert Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 394 A.2d 308 (1978).

The only reference made to the power to hire or fire is in section 3, which grants the board of health the “power to appoint such sanitary inspectors as they deem necessary.” This language clearly grants no authority to appoint or discharge a health officer.

In the Matter of Albert Gamble, 118 N.H. 771, 777, 394 A.2d 308,311 (1978); see State v. Wilton R.R.