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Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 769, 771 (1978) (directing legislature to make “adequate appropriations” to fund the constitutional right to counsel after finding that existing scheme was “a far cry” from meeting constitutional mandate and making no mention of traditional injunction criteria).

II, art. 73-a; Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 770 (1978), as well as our superintending control over the courts, In re Mussman, 112 N.H. 99, 101 (1972); see RSA 490:4 (1997), includes the power to discipline those judges who fail to maintain this constitutionally mandated standard of behavior.

We are the final arbiter of State constitutional disputes.

Thus, the judicial branch has the inherent power to regulate officers of the court.

This court is the final arbiter of our constitution’s due process requirements.

“The power to regulate officers of the court is a power inherent in the judicial branch.” Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 770, 394 A.2d 834, 839 (1978).

> In the past we have noted that “[t]he power to regulate officers of the court is a power inherent in the judicial branch.” Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 770, 394 A.2d 834, 838-39 (1978).

12 and 15; Abbott v. Potter, 125 N.H. 257, 259, 480 A.2d 118, 119 (1984); Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 770, 394 A.2d 834, 839 (1978).

Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 541, 542, 133 A.2d 790, 792 (1957); see also Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 768, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (1978).

I, art’s. 12 and 15; Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 770, 394 A.2d 834, 839 (1978).

at the same rate as appointed counsel in a criminal case heard before the superior court.” Pursuant to this court’s decision in Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 769-71, 394 A.2d 834, 838-39 (1978), this court from time to time has issued and modified indigent-counsel-fee schedules.

Effective assistance of counsel “is a right fundamental to criminal defendants” and “is required by both the Federal and State Constitutions.” Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 770, 394 A.2d 834, 839 (1978); see U.S. Const, amend.

We note that as recently as 1978, two taxpayers sued the State disputing the constitutionality of a statute that established a maximum fee recoverable by court-appointed attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants.

Opinion of the Justices supra; see Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 769, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (1978); N.H. Const., pt.

Although we have stated that the State constitution “requires that the costs of services rendered by attorneys on behalf of indigent defendants be borne by the government of this State,” Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 769, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (1978), we did not mean to imply that all such costs must ultimately be borne by the State in every case.

Except for these defendants or any pending appeals where the fee has not yet been paid, this opinion will not be given retroactive effect.