Cited by

Additionally, we have also held that “[i]n certain instances attorney’s fees should be allowed for an award of medical benefits.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 26 (1979) (decided under prior law).

“The legislative intent is to be found not in what the *668 legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23 (1979).

Surge and AIG argue, however, that our decision in Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20 (1979), precludes the petitioner from receiving interest on her medical bills.

“[Tjhe legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

“It is well established law that the intention of the legislature expressed by the words in the statute itself is the touchstone to its meaning.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979), appeal after remand, 120 N.H. 665, 421 A.2d 1005 (1980).

Olson v. Town of Fitzwilliam, 142 N.H. 339, 344, 702 A.2d 318, 321 (1997); cf. Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979) (“this court cannot speculate upon any supposed legislative *121 intent not appropriately expressed in the language of the act itself”).

“[T]he legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have said, but rather in the meaning of what it did say.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

The petitioner analogizes his situation to that of the comatose claimant in Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 397 A.2d 640 (1979), where we held that the claimant was entitled to benefits for permanent impairment, having “lost the use of every member of his body.” Id.

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979), appeal after remand, 120 N.H. 665, 421 A.2d 1005 (1980).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

“It is well established law that the intention of the legislature expressed by the words in the statute itself is the touchstone of its meaning.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Reports of commissions established to prepare or recommend statutory revisions can prove to be valuable aids in construing particular statutes.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 *781 (1979); see Morgenroth & Assoc’s, Inc. v. Town of Tilton, 121 N.H. 511, 515, 431 A.2d 770, 772 (1981).

Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Caswell v. BCI Geonetics, Inc., 121 N.H. 1048, 1050, 437 A.2d 321, 322 (1981); Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

This court has held in Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979) (citing International Business Machines Corporation v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134, 355 A.2d 236, 241 (1974)), that “[w]hen the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by *641 construction.” In addition, RSA 21:2 provides: “[W]ords a

In Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979), we excluded from our consideration the labor commissioner’s recollections of considerations allegedly arrived at by some unnamed “informal committee.” We see no reason to alter the rationale or holding of Corson in that regard and, therefore, must exclude the interpretive opinion of the

Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980); Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Hence this court cannot speculate upon any supposed legislative intent not appropriately expressed in the language of the act itself.” Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979); see Sant Bani Ashram v. Dept. of Empl.

Dupont v. Chagnon, 119 N.H. 792, 794, 408 A.2d 408, 409 (1979); Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23-24, 397 A.2d 640, 642-43 (1979).

Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 397 A.2d 640 (1979); Kinchla v. Baumner, 114 N.H. 818, 330 A.2d 112 (1974).

Corson v. Brown Prods., Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 397 A.2d 640 (1979).

Lewis v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 915 (1980); Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979).

We will give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in a statute, Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979), unless such an interpretation would lead to an absurd, State v. Slayton, 116 N.H. 613, 615, 367 A.2d 575, 577 (1976), unjust, In re Sargent, 116 N.H. 77, 82, 354 A.2d 404, 407 (1976), or illogical result.

It follows “that the intention of the legislature expressed by the words of the statute itself is the touchstone to its meaning.” Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979) (emphasis added).