Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Arthur, 391 A.2d 884.

13 citing documents.

  • State v. Cotell 722 A.2d 507 N.H. 1998
    State v. LaRose, 127 N.H. 146, 152, 497 A.2d 1224, 1230 (1985); State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 564, 391 A.2d 884, 886 (1978).
  • State v. Lucius 663 A.2d 605 N.H. 1995
    We first determine whether the evidence withheld by the State was exculpatory, see, e.g., State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 563, 391 A.2d 884, 886 (1978), and then, if so, whether the evidence was material, therefore requiring reversal.
  • State v. Paris 627 A.2d 582 N.H. 1993
    State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 563, 391 A.2d 884, 885 (1978) (prosecutor’s deliberate delay in complying with court-ordered discovery, for purpose of making evidence less useful to accused, did not necessarily warrant “a new trial or the drastic remedy of reversal”).
  • State v. Dedrick 607 A.2d 127 N.H. 1992
    In State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 391 A.2d 884 (1978), we set forth the factors to be considered when a Brady violation is alleged: ‘“(a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and, (c) the materiality of the evidence.’” Id.
  • State v. Ramos 553 A.2d 275 N.H. 1988
    State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 391 A.2d 884 (1978); State v. Thorp, 116 N.H. 303, 358 A.2d 655 (1976).
  • State v. Lemire 543 A.2d 425 N.H. 1988
    State v. Glidden, 123 N.H. 126, 136, 459 A.2d 1136, 1142 (1983); State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 564, 391 A.2d 884, 886 (1978).
  • State v. Colbath 540 A.2d 1212 N.H. 1988
    Brady v. Maryland, supra at 88; State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 563, 391 A.2d 884, 885 (1978); State v. Dukette, 113 N.H. 472, 477, 309 A.2d 886, 889 (1973).
  • State v. Glidden 459 A.2d 1136 N.H. 1983
    The trial court had broad discretion to determine whether the trial should continue, State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 564, 391 A.2d 884, 886 (1978), and we cannot say that he abused his discretion based on the record before us. The court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it.
  • State v. Preston 427 A.2d 32 N.H. 1981
    It is only fair to state that, because of the continuing problem, we will take a firmer stand in the future.
  • State v. Watson 424 A.2d 417 N.H. 1980
    It is true that a delay in furnishing a criminal defendant with information which is favorable to him and material to the *952 issue of guilt or innocence may amount to an unconstitutional suppression of evidence if “the delay in disclosure substantially prejudiced the defendant in the preparation of his defense.” State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 563, 391 A.2d 884, 886 (1978).
  • Jerry's Sport Center, Inc. v. Novick 415 A.2d 331 N.H. 1980
    “Violation of rules found to be in the nature of harassment, frivolous action, intended to cause undue delay, or similarly motivated, which put the opposing party to undue expense, would justify the assessment of counsel fees to *374 be paid by the offending counsel to the other party.” Tuttle v. Palmer, 118 N.H. 553, 556, 392 A.2d 574, 575 (1978); see State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 391 A.2d 884 (1978).
  • State v. Gullick 411 A.2d 1113 N.H. 1980
    discovery____” Relying on State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 391 A.2d 884 (1978), he declares that prosecutors must be held to a high standard of conduct and that the failure of the State to comply with the court order is inexcusable and prejudiced him in the preparation of his defense.
  • State v. Scarlett 395 A.2d 1244 N.H. 1978
    We hold public prosecutors to a high standard of conduct.