Cited by

State v. Plaut, 124 N.H. 813, 813 (1984) (determining that in the context of a second degree assault, “[w]hether the victim’s injuries constituted ‘serious bodily injury’ was a question of fact for the jury to decide”); State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 869 (1978) (whether a victim of AFSA “has suffered serious physical or psychological injury must be presented to the jury as would evidence of any other element of the crime”).

easonable doubt before a defendant may be sentenced for a class A felony.” See State v. LaRose, 127 N.H. 146, 154 (1985) (holding that “[a] defendant is guilty of the class A felony of kidnapping only if the jury finds that the evidence establishes both the class B felony of kidnapping as defined in RSA 633:1, I, and the elements of a class A felony set forth in RSA 633:1, II”); State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 869 (1978) (concluding that “whether a [kidnapping and] rape victim has suffered serio

Anthony, 151 N.H. at 493-95; see State v. Burke, 122 N.H. 565, 570 (1982); State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866 (1978).

“[A] fair reading of ‘serious bodily injury’ could include within its definition the serious psychological injuries of a rape victim.” State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 868 (1978); see State v. Wisowaty, 137 N.H. 298, 307 (1993) (serious bodily injury includes psychological injuries and mental anguish).

Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient.

Moreover, while “mere presence” at a crime is insufficient to convict, see State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978), a rational jury could conclude that the defendant lied to the police about his presence in the building at the time of the fire.

Additional evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that the defendant’s involvement exceeded “[m]ere presence.” State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978).

State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978); State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54, 61 (Vt.), cert.

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to make a person criminally responsible.

We have held that serious bodily injury includes psychological injuries and mental anguish.

State v. Hamel, 123 N.H. 670, 679, 466 A.2d 555, 560 (1983); State v. Noel, 119 N.H. 522, 528, 404 A.2d 290, 293 (1979); State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 867, 395 A.2d 1234, 1237 (1978); State v. Caldrain, 115 N.H. 390, 391-92, 342 A.2d 628, 629 (1975); State v. Warren, 114 N.H. 196, 197, 317 A.2d 566, 567 (1974).

State v. Good,win, *298 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978); see also State v. Guay, 130 N.H. 413, 421, 543 A.2d 910, 915 (1988).

“[i]t is for the jury to resolve whether intoxication negates the element of intent.” State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 867, 395 A.2d 1234, 1237 (1978); accord Noel, supra at 528, 404 A.2d at 293; State v. Warren, 114 N.H. 196, 317 A.2d 566 (1974).

State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978) (citations omitted).

Defendant cites language in State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 395 A.2d 1234 (1978) for support.

This encompasses the requirement that the accomplice’s acts were designed to aid the primary actor in committing the offense, see State v. Burke, *64 122 N.H. 565, 570, 448 A.2d 962, 965 (1982), and that the accomplice had the purpose to “make the crime succeed,” State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978) (quoting 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 114, at 60 (Supp. 1978)).

Therefore, in order to obtain a conviction, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s gun was loaded.

It was the province of the jury to determine whether intoxication negated deliberation and premeditation, State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 867, 395 A.2d 1234, 1237 (1978); see RSA 626:4, and we will not disturb its finding.

See, e.g., State v. Champagne, 119 N.H. 118, 121, 399 A.2d *592 287, 289 (1979); State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 869, 395 A.2d 1234, 1238 (1978).

State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978); State v. Shippee, 115 N.H. 694, 695-96, 349 A.2d 587, 588 (1975).

Defendant Burke was not passively present at the scene of the crime; rather, his acts were designed to aid the primary actor.

RSA 633:2 (Criminal Restraint) provides that “[a] person is guilty of a class B felony if he knowingly confines another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury.” We have held that the phrase “serious bodily injury” includes mental anguish and psychological injuries.

The defendant argues that although circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction, State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978), it must exclude “any other rational conclusion” to be sufficient.

We have held that, in reviewing a trial court’s refusal to set aside a verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence, “this court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which is entitled to all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence (citations omitted).” State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978); State v. Berry, 117 N.H. 352, 355, 373 A.2d 355, 358 (1977).

2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976); see 2 F. HARPER & F. James, supra § 18.4, at 1031; State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 868, 395 A.2d 1234, 1237-38 (1978) (a person’s health depends upon both a sound body and sound mind).

“Although the State must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all the essential elements, it may rely on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.” State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978).

I, art. 15; State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 395 A.2d 1234 (1978); State v. Ferris, 249 A.2d 523 (Me. 1969).

At trial he intends to raise the defense of consent and his only witness to corroborate this defense, Alvah Goodwin, was convicted as an accomplice to these crimes and has appealed to this court.