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Similarly, in State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415-16 (1977), we found safety to be a relevant public interest and thereby allowed the piercing of the physician-patient and “psychologist-client” privileges at a criminal commitment hearing held to decide whether the defendant posed a danger to society.

State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415 (1977) (discussing RSA 329:26 and RSA 330-A:19, former psychologist-patient privilege).

State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415, 373 A.2d 1325 (1977) (discussing RSA 329:26 and RSA 330-A:19, former psychologist-patient privilege).

Compare In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. at *226 385-87 (holding mere conclusory statement that treating physician offers best evidence as to dangerousness insufficient to establish necessity where other sources of information were potentially available), with State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415-16 (1977) (finding that without disclosure of privileged records as best information available bearing on defendant’s dangerousness and mental condition, the State would have been “virtually deprived” of evid

Though the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to encourage trust and disclosure between patient and psychotherapist so as to maximize the effectiveness of therapy, the privilege is not absolute.

The physician-patient privilege is meant to encourage the patient to disclose relevant facts fully so as to receive complete and appropriate treatment.

Traditionally, we have carefully guarded the confidential relationship between patients and their medical providers, State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415 (1977), to fulfill the legislature’s purpose of encouraging patients to fully divulge personal, and at times, embarrassing, information so their medical providers can, in turn, provide complete and appropriate medical treatment.

Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 534 A.2d 720 (1987); In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. 379, 493 A.2d 472 (1985); State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 373 A.2d 1325 (1977).

Like the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege is meant to encourage the patient to disclose relevant facts fully so as to receive complete and appropriate treatment.

In State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 373 A.2d 1325 (1977), for example, we recognized that the superior court’s responsibility to determine whether the commitment of a criminally insane defendant should be renewed and extended beyond its original term carried with it the power to obtain access to the only recent evidence bearing on the issue of dangero

State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415, 373 A.2d 1325, 1327 (1977); State v. Farrow, 116 N.H. 731, 733, 366 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1976).

Additionally, the trial court can allow the admission of privileged information if the admission is “essential and reasonably necessary to permit counsel adequately to cross-examine for the purpose of showing unreliability or bias.” State v. Farrow, 116 N.H. 731, 733, 366 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1976); see State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415, 373 A.2d 1325, 1327 (1977); cf. State v. LaClair, 121 N.H. 743, 745-46, 433 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1981).

.” In the context of the disclosure of medical testimony and records in a recommittal hearing to determine dangerousness (current version at RSA 651:ll-a (Supp. 1979)), we stated that “the privileges in question are not absolute and must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential.” State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415, 373 A.2d 1325, 1327 (1977); cf. State v. Thorp, *912 116 N.H. 303, 310, 358 A.2d 655, 661 (1976).

State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 373 A.2d 1325 (1977); see Sevigny v. Burns, 108 N.H. 95, 227 A.2d 775 (1967); In re Miller, 98 N.H. 107, 95 A.2d 116 (1953).

*386 This court has previously considered the conflict between the provisions of these statutory privileges and the requirement of a commitment renewal hearing for the criminally insane under RSA 651:ll-a on the issue of dangerousness.