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We have held that a reasonable period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari should be determined by the appeal period set forth in a substantively analogous statute or situation.

id.; Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 784 (1977).

Unlike an appeal pursuant to RSA chapter 541, however, “[t]here is no statutory provision setting any time limit during which an aggrieved party must file his certiorari petition.” Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 784 (1977).

We have, however, held that where the legislature has provided a time limitation for what constitutes a reasonable time in a substantively analogous situation, such a time limitation “will prove a fair guideline as to what constitutes a *736 reasonable time.” Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 784 (1977).

Applying the rule that where an appeal period is not specified the court may borrow one from an analogous cause of action, Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 784, 378 A.2d 1375, 1377 (1977), the trial court determined that the thirty-day statute of limitations for appeals from certain administrative agencies set forth in RSA 541:6 governed, by analogy, the plaintiff’s petition.

We have held that the appropriate period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari is to be determined by the appeal period set forth in a substantively analogous statute or situation.

Although petitions for writs of certiorari are not generally subject to a statute of limitations, such a statute may provide a guide for determining the timeliness of a request for certiorari review.

We deem thirty days to be a reasonable period.

In Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 378 A.2d 1375 (1977), we ruled that the reasonable period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari would be determined by the appeal period set out in a substantially analogous statute or situation.

The plaintiffs’ appeal therefore is not strictly governed by the thirty-day limit in RSA 541:6, cf. Tasker v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 115 N.H. 204, 208, 338 A.2d 543, 546 (1975), but rather the “reasonable time” restriction of RSA 490:4 (Supp. 1979).

Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 378 A.2d 1375 (1977); see 2A C. Sands, supra §§ 53.01, 55.01.

If, after exhausting proper administrative avenues, plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the result, they may petition this court for a writ of certiorari.

If, after exhausting proper administrative avenues, plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the result, they may petition this court for a writ of certiorari.

Recently, in Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 378 A.2d 1375 (1977), we stated, Where the legislature has acted to provide an appeal period in a substantively analogous situation, that appeal period will prove a fair guideline as to what constitutes a reasonable time.

Wilson v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 783, 378 A.2d 1375 (1977); see Dixon v. State, 105 N.H. 123, 193 A.2d 890 (1963).

It is true that RSA ch. 541 does not provide a method of appeal from the determination of every administrative agency, but only where an appeal is specifically “authorized by law.” RSA 541:2; see Connell’s New and Used Cars v. State, 117 N.H. at 531-32, 375 A.2d at 257-58; Wilson v. Personnel Commission, 117 N.H. 783, 378 A.2d 1375 (1977).