Cited by

Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 601 (1978) (“An employee’s compensation is not necessarily limited to his salary, but will include any other benefits that are an integral part of the employee’s contemplated compensation.”); see also Gilman v. County of Cheshire, 126 N.H. 445, 448 (1985) (“In New Hampshire, sick leave benefits, where authorized in t

These benefits are an integral part of the contemplated compensation and become vested at the time one becomes a permanent State employee or continues in such employment.

Retirement and related benefits under RSA chapter 100-A “constitute a substantial part of an employee’s compensation” and “are essentially created for the protection of the employee and his family.” Id.; see Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 601-02 (1978) (recognizing that retirement and other benefits “can attract qualified persons to enter and remain in State employment”).

King v. Thomson, 119 N.H. at 221, 400 A.2d at 1171; cf. Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 601-02, 392 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1978) (employee benefits become vested at time one becomes a permanent State employee or continues in such employment; relating to classified employees); see also Society v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas.

at 67-68, 133 A.2d at 488; see also Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 601, 392 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1978).

Because diminution of judicial salaries is constitutionally suspect and undoubtedly violative of the contract clause of the United States Constitution, we deal in this case only with fees collected by the probate judiciary for judicial services and not in any way with their pre-existing salary scheme.

In New Hampshire, sick leave benefits, where authorized in the terms of employment, are considered “an integral part of the public employee’s contemplated- compensation.” Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 601, 602, 392 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1978); State Employees’ Ass’n of N.H. v. Belknap County, 122 N.H. 614, 621, 448 A.2d 969, 972 (1982).

Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 602, 392 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1978); see RSA 100-A:3 (state employees obtain permanent employee status after six months’ service).

see Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 601-02, 392 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1978).

We cannot say that the master’s action was unjust or unreasonable in denying the defendant’s request to reopen the hearing for “newly-discovered” evidence.

Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 597, 601, 392 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1978); Wilson v. State Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 424, 426, 387 A.2d 1160, 1161 (1978); Slayton v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 206, 208, 371 A.2d 1159, 1161 (1977); Tasker v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n, 115 N.H. 204, 206, 338 A.2d 543, 544 (1975).

RSA 98:3; cf. Melton v. Personnel Comm’n, 119 N.H. 272, 280, 401 A.2d 1060, 1065 (1979); Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm’n., 118 N.H. 597, 601, 392 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1978); Wilson v. State Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 424, 426, 387 A.2d 1160, 1161 (1978).

The commission’s findings of fact are prima facie lawful and reasonable and its orders must be sustained, except for errors of law, unless the clear preponderance of the evidence establishes that the order is unjust or unreasonable.

Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm'n, 118 N.H. 597, 392 A.2d 1193; Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).