Cited by

I. Analysis The petitioner asks this court to “issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Governor and Executive Council to re-consider [the petitioner’s] request in a manner consistent with the dictates set forth in [State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296 (1978)].” The petitioner argues that under this court’s application of Part I, Article 18 of the New Hampshire Constitution in Farrow, she has a constitutional right to “demonstrate her fitness to return to society” before the Governor and Executive Council

[is] to reform, not to exterminate mankind,’ that clause reveals at a minimum a tension between the death penalty and the constitutional value therein expressed.” The defendant observes that, “the design of the death penalty, of course, is to exterminate, not reform, the person subjected to it.” [106] We have “never held that article 18 invalidates a capital punishment statute.” State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 305 (1978).

Traditional Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis is the “abstract evaluation of the appropriateness of a sentence for a particular crime.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984); see State v. Dayutis, 127 N.H. 101, 105 (1985); cf. State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 302-03 (1978).

Kivlin, 145 N.H. at 722-23; State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 306 (1978) (affirming denial of immunity when proffered testimony would not have provided defendant with alibi or otherwise exculpated him).

State v. Hamel, 123 N.H. 670 (1983); see also State v. Newcomb, 140 N.H. 72 (1995); State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296 (1978).

Criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to immunity for defense witnesses who exercise their fifth amendment privileges against self-incrimination.

State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 305-06, 386 A.2d 808, 814 (1978) (no due process violation if defense witness cannot directly exculpate defendant and can only cast doubt on State witness); TORCIA, supra at 223-29 (although prosecutor has prerogative to grant immunity, prosecutor may not be compelled to exercise such prerogative absent due process

State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 299, 386 A.2d 808, 810 (1978); RSA 630:1-a, III (Supp. 1977).

The State relies upon the cases of State v. Scarlett, 121 N.H. 37, 41, 426 A.2d 25, 28 (1981); State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 281, 415 A.2d 320, 322 (1980); and State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 307, 386 A.2d 808, 815 (1978), in arguing that the trial court applied an erroneous standard for determining the admissibility of the testimony, requiring that Agent Deedrick must be able to identify a particular person as the source of the crime scene hairs.

Although a *270 defendant has no per se right to obtain a potentially immunizing order, see State v. MacManus, 130 N.H. 256, 259, 536 A.2d 203, 204 (1987), the court has recognized that prosecution without such an order can deny due process under some circumstances, see State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 306, 386 A.2d 808, 814 (1978).

generally State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 306, 386 A.2d 808, 814 (1978) (standards under which due process addressed).

We cannot say that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by any prejudice to the defendant, and therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.

State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 302, 386 A.2d *317 808, 812 (1978) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, supra at 182, and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).

The legislature is charged with making the law, and the judiciary is responsible for interpreting and applying it.

We conclude that exhibit 24 constituted a representative sample of the seized material, and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the unanalyzed material.

State v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 618, 625 495 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1985); State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 307, 386 A.2d 808, 815 (1978).

II, art. 5, which conform to constitutional limits, State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 305, 386 A.2d 808, 814 (1978).

State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 304, 386 A.2d 808, 813 (1978); see Trustees &c. Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569 (1940).

We held in State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 307, 386 A.2d 808, 815 (1978), that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit testimony that hair which was found on the body of the victim was similar to hair of the defendant even though the witness could not positively identify the hair as that of the defendant.

RSA 630:l-a III; State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 300-05, 386 A.2d 808, 810-14 (1978).

RSA 630:l-a III (those convicted of first-degree murder are not eligible for parole, while those convicted of second-degree murder are).

This testimony was properly admitted.

When the proffered evidence is relevant and otherwise unobjectionable, we will uphold the court’s decision to admit evidence claimed to be prejudicial unless it is so inherently prejudicial as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

We will not disturb that determination.

We affirmed the conviction and the constitutionality of his sentence.

.” State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 306, 386 A.2d 808, 814 (1978); see Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV.

Consequently, Mr. Goodwin’s exercise of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the present case would not deprive the defendant of his sixth amendment compulsory process rights.

I, art. 18, which states in part that “the true design of all punishments [is] to reform, not to exterminate mankind.” It should be noted that this constitutional language sanctions “punishment” as a method of reforming the criminal.

II, art. 5; see State v. Farrow, 118 N.H. 296, 305, 386 A.2d 808, 814 (1978).