Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Kenna, 374 A.2d 427.

13 citing documents.

  • State v. Samuel Pennock 168 N.H. 294 N.H. 2015
    utterance is made in response to a question does not necessarily bar its admission as an excited utterance.” State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 308 (1977).
  • Simpson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 744 A.2d 625 N.H. 1999
    t appear to the satisfaction of the presiding justice that the utterance was a spontaneous verbal reaction to some startling or shocking event, made at a time when the speaker was still in a state of nervous excitement produced by that event and before he had time to contrive or misrepresent.” State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 11, 425 A.2d 255, 257 (1981) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 307, 374 A.2d 427, 429 (1977).
  • State v. MacArthur 644 A.2d 68 N.H. 1994
    See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 131 N.H. 512, *600 518, 556 A.2d 302, 306 (1989); State v. Glidden, 123 N.H. 126, 133, 459 A.2d 1136, 1140 (1983); State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 309, 374 A.2d 427, 430 (1977).
  • State v. Lemieux 615 A.2d 635 N.H. 1992
    The testimony at issue was therefore merely cumulative.
  • State v. Torrence 587 A.2d 1227 N.H. 1991
    State v. Pugliese, 122 N.H. 1141, 1147-48, 455 A.2d 1018, 1022 (1982); State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 606, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1980); State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 309, 374 A.2d 427, 430 (1977).
  • State v. Woods 546 A.2d 1073 N.H. 1988
    To provide this substitute guarantee it must appear to the satisfaction of the presiding justice that the utterance was a spontaneous verbal reaction to some startling or shocking event, made at a time when the speaker was still in a state of nervous excitement produced by that event, and before he had time to contrive or misrepresent.” State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 307, 374 A.2d 427, 429 (1977) (quoting Semprini v. Railroad, 87 N.H. 279, 280, 179 A. 349, 350 (1935)).
  • State v. Coppola 536 A.2d 1236 N.H. 1987
    Under such circumstances the fact that the victim gave her statements in answer to questions is in no way inconsistent with the probable spontaneity of her responses, see State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 374 A.2d 427 (1977), and nothing in the record casts any doubt on admissibility under Rule 803(2).
  • State v. Shannon 484 A.2d 1164 N.H. 1984
    Although in certain circumstances hearsay statements may be characterized as merely *661 cumulative, thus not constituting reversible error, see State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 309, 374 A.2d 427, 430 (1977), this is not such a case.
  • State v. Berry 470 A.2d 881 N.H. 1983
    Although the United States Supreme Court has not held that, absent actual suppression, the non-preservation or destruction of evidence by the State is a violation of due process, see United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969); State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 310, 374 A.2d 427, 430 (1977), this court has recognized that the right to due process is implicated when evidence in a criminal trial is destroyed, State v. Miskolczi, 123 N.H. 626, 629, 465 A.2d 919, 921 (1983) (citing United Stat
  • Vatistas v. Hickens 431 A.2d 121 N.H. 1981
    State v. Donovan, 120 N.H. 603, 606, 419 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1980); State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 309, 374 A.2d 427, 430 (1977); see Patten v. Newton, 102 N.H. 444, 447, 159 A.2d 809, 811 (1960).
  • State v. Hudson 425 A.2d 255 N.H. 1981
    State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 307-09, 374 A.2d 427, 429-30 (1977); State v. Martineau, 114 N.H. 552, 556-58, 324 A.2d 718, 721-22 (1974); Murray v. Railroad, 72 N.H. 32, 38, 54 A. 289, 292 (1903).
  • State v. Donovan 419 A.2d 1102 N.H. 1980
    State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. 305, 374 A.2d 427 (1977); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950).
  • State v. Plummer 374 A.2d 431 N.H. 1977
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting testimony as to the deceased’s statements describing his assailant.