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This suggests that the stock sale was an integrated part of a much larger transaction.

A “meeting of the minds” requires that there be manifest agreement; mere mental assent is not sufficient.

As noted above, we interpret the terms of a contract by considering the contract as a whole, see Commercial Union Assurance Co., 120 N.H. at 623, 419 A.2d at 1113, and will give its terms their reasonable meaning, see Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977).

C & M Realty Trust v. Wiedenkeller, 133 N.H. 470, 476, 578 A.2d 354, 357 (1990); see also Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977) (intentions of parties to contract are determined based on terms of agreement taken as a whole and contract will be given meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person); Citizens Nat.

The parties’ intent will be determined based on objective standards, rather than on their subjective, unmanifested states of mind.

A stipulated agreement is contractual in nature and therefore is governed by contract rules.

If this argument has any plausibility, however, it depends on ignoring the cardinal rule that each contractual instrument is to be read as a whole, Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977), for when the provisions isolated above are returned to context, any implication of contractual duty disappears.

App. 509, 510, 271 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1980) (specific provision prevails over broader one); see also Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133-34 (1977) (express grant in agreement supersedes broad ban).

Co., 122 N.H. 515, 516, 446 A.2d 1172, 1173 (1982); Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977); see also Smart v. Huckins, 82 N.H. 342, 347, 134 A. 520, 523 (1926) (evidence of subsequent practical construction admissible).

When interpreting contracts, the intent of the parties is determined based upon an objective reading of the agreement as a whole.

In interpreting this contract, we will give language used by the parties its common meaning, Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611-12, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980), and will give the contract itself the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person.

The intent of the parties is determined by an objective standard, and not by actual mental assent.

We do not consider this argument because it is clearly contradictory to the intention of the stipulation agreed upon by the parties that the passageway vested in the residuary legatees upon the death of the common grantor.

In reaching the proper interpretation we require that the words and phrases used by the *612 parties be given their common meaning, McIntire Enterprises, Inc. v. Geiger, 94 N.H. 368, 53 A.2d 328 (1947), and this court will determine the meaning of the contract based upon the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person.

The intent of parties in entering an agreement is to be judged by objective or external criteria rather than by unmanifested states of mind of the parties.

“A stipulation embraces whatever its terms reasonably imply.” Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977); Burbank v. Nordahl, 199 Cal.

The intentions of the parties to a contract are determined from the agreement taken as a whole.

Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977); Griswold v. Heat Corp., 108 N.H. 119, 123, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (1967).

Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977); Rivier College v. St.