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Of course, this standard of review does not mean that a trial court’s denial of a continuance will be treated superficially by this court.

In a different context, we have reviewed a decision on a motion to recuse a trial judge using an abuse-of-discretion standard.

Id.; see also State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 872 (1977).

However, a defendant’s right to counsel of his choice — including out-of- state counsel — is not absolute; it is “circumscribed in several important respects.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; see State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 880 (1977) (“The right to counsel of one’s choice is not unlimited.

“There are no mechanical tests to determine when due process has been violated by the denial of a continuance, but in each case the totality of the circumstances must be considered.” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 880 (1977); see State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 640 (1985); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.”).

The test for evaluating whether a court erred in refusing to disqualify itself based on its alleged partiality is the same under the New Hampshire Constitution, the Code of Judicial Conduct and general principles of federal due process.

In addition, we reject the argument that because the house of representatives voted in favor of articles of impeachment against the chief justice, his recusal in this unrelated matter is necessary to avoid an “appearance of bias.” See State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 882 (1977).

II, art. 73-a, and to suspend a sitting judge or assign another judge to a case, see In re Mussman, 112 N.H. 99, 102-03, 289 A.2d 403, 405-06 (1972) (referencing the right of the citizenry to impartial jurists under Part I, Article 35), but also to review a judge’s refusal to grant a motion to recuse, see, e.g., State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 882-83, 379 A.2d 813, 823-24 (1977).

The elements of criminal contempt are threefold: (1) that a valid court order covering the defendant exists; (2) that the defendant had notice of that order; and (3) that the defendant intentionally committed acts in violation of that order.

It remains true that “[u]nder the immunity presently available, a trial court does not have the power to grant immunity on its own.” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 884, 379 A.2d 813, 824 (1977); see, e.g., State v. Hamlin, 499 A.2d 45, 52 (Vt. 1985).

A defendant may be asked to make such a choice provided that “the choice presented to him is not constitutionally offensive,” id., and does not thereby violate the defendant’s right to due process.

State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 543, 506 A.2d 699, 703 (1986); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 879-80, 379 A.2d 813, 822 (1977).

We have held that the State is required to prove in criminal contempt proceedings that a *271 valid order existed, of which the defendant had knowledge, and that the defendant intentionally failed to comply with the order.

We note that State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 379 A.2d 813 (1977), may be.

The court must prepare, sign, and enter on the record an order of contempt, reciting the facts the court observed and which gave rise to the contempt.” Town of Nottingham, 118 N.H. at 286, 385 A.2d at 854 (citing State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 379 A.2d 813 (1977)).

This court has previously ruled that a defendant has no constitutional right to have immunity conferred upon a witness who claims the right against self-incrimination and who possesses potentially exculpatory evidence.

Looking at the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State with all reasonable inferences therefrom,” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 872-73, 379 A.2d 813, 818 (1977) (quoting State v. Gilbert, 115 N.H. 665, 666, 348 A.2d 713, 714 (1975), itself quoting State v. Canney, 112 N.H. 301, 303, 294 A.2d 382, 383 (1972)), we conclude that the record reveals sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction.

at 305-06, 386 A.2d at 814; State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 884, 379 A.2d 813, 824 (1977).

State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 379 A.2d 813 (1977) (eight days adequate time to prepare for trial where the evidence was fresh and *296 the issues for trial limited).

The court’s action was proper under the general rule, which is no less applicable when the public defender is involved, that “a court can compel a defendant to go to trial with present counsel if the court determines, within its sound discretion, that the objections to counsel are dilatory tactics or otherwise unwarranted.” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 880, 379 A.2d 813, 822 (1977) (citing Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1976); Lofton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1973)).

“[T]he matter of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge,” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 879, 379 A.2d 813, 822 (1977), and a denial of a continuance will not constitute error absent an abuse of that discretion.

However, this court must determine whether the failure of the superior court to grant the continuance denied the defendant his right to due process.

at 839, 424 A.2d at 203 (quoting Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68 (1948)); see State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 876, 379 A.2d 813, 819 (1977).

Whether the issue of the propriety of recusal is discussed in terms of a “per se” rule or of a “reasonableness” standard, the defendant must show the existence of “bias, or such likelihood of bias, or an appearance of bias that the judge is unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused.” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 882, 379 A.2d 813, 823-24 (1977) (citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588 (1964)).

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Scarlett, 121 N.H. 37, 40, 426 A.2d 25, 27 (1981); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 872, 379 A.2d 813, 818 (1977).

Security, 121 N.H. 74, 77, 426 A.2d 34, 36 (1981); RSA 21:2; see State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 874, 379 A.2d 813, 818 (1977).

Considering all the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, once a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties renders a final order within its authority, that order “becomes res judicata and not subject to collateral attack in the contempt proceedings.” Maggio v. Zeitz, supra at 68; State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 876-77, 379 A.2d 813, 819 (1977).

Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion.

We note that RSA 516:34, on its face, does not limit immunity to prosecution witnesses.

State v. Spade, 118 N.H. 186, 190, 385 A.2d 115, 117 (1978); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 879, 379 A.2d 813, 822 (1977).

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (notice requirements based upon due process); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 874, 379 A.2d 813, 819 (1977) (notice of injunction).

State v. Gross, 117 N.H. 853, 379 A.2d 804 (1977); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 379 A.2d 813 (1977).

State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 872, 379 A.2d 813, 817 (1977); accord, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975), that there is no constitutional right to have a defense witness immunized because that witness *306 has exercised his fifth amendment rights.

The court must prepare, sign, and enter on the record an order of contempt, reciting the facts the court observed and which gave rise to the contempt.

“[T]he matter of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 379 A.2d 813 (1977).

.” We agree that in criminal con-tempts the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in violation of the court order.

State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 293, 235 A.2d 111, 114 (1967); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 379 A.2d 813 (1977).