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Nevertheless, an agency’s interpretation will not be given deference if it is contrary to the express statutory language.

Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977) (long-standing practical and plausible interpretation of statute *23 without legislative interference constitutes evidence that administrative construction conforms to legislative intent).

We note that the legislature has had ample opportunity to modify RSA 374:26 if it disagreed with the commission’s interpretation of its franchising authority in Parker and AT&T. That it has not done so is evidence that “the administrative construction conforms to the legislative intent.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).

“We have held that where a statute is of doubtful meaning, the long-standing practical and plausible interpretation applied by the agency responsible for its implementation, without any interference by the legislature, is evidence that the administrative construction conforms to the legislative intent.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).

Assoc’s of N.E., 131 N.H. 560, 565-66, 556 A.2d 1183, 1187 (1989); N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 109, 489 A.2d 615, 619 (1985); Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).

Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); see also Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977) (even longstanding administrative interpretation of statute not controlling if contrary to express statutory language).

v. State, supra at 569, 503 A.2d at 832 (quoting Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1971)).

“[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977); N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 126 N.H. 104, 108, 489 A.2d 615, 618 (1985).

On this factual basis, the plaintiffs urge us to apply the rule that “where a statute is of doubtful meaning, the long-standing practical and plausible interpretation applied by the agency responsible for its implementation, without any interference by the legislature, is evidence that the administrative construction conforms to the legislative intent.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977) (citations omitted).

where, as here, the agency’s interpretation is in clear conflict with the express statutory language.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).

Accordingly, the WSPCC’s interpretations of the terms of RSA 72:12-a (Supp. 1983) are entitled to great deference, unless an interpretation is in clear conflict with the express statutory language.

“We have held that where a statute is of doubtful meaning, the long-standing practical and plausible interpretation applied by the agency responsible for its implementation, without any interfer *484 ence by the legislature, is evidence that the administrative construction conforms to the legislative intent.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).

Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977); Upson v. Board of Trustees, 124 N.H. 787, 474 A.2d 582 (1984); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979); Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095, 1100 (D.N.H.

The fact that the board has maintained its interpretation consistently over a period of years is irrelevant “where, as here, the agency’s interpretation is in clear conflict with the express statutory language.” Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977).

Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 609, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (1977); Farrelly v. Timberlane Regional School Dist., 114 N.H. 560, 564, 324 A.2d 723, 726 (1974).

The quarterly payment schedule was established by administrative regulation, not statute, and we have no basis for presuming that the legislature had such a schedule in mind when it spoke of “timely” payment.

Naum v. Naum, 101 N.H. 367, 369, 143 A.2d 424, 426 (1958); Hamby v. Adams, 117 N.H. 606, 610, 376 A.2d 519, 522 (1977).